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Abstract
We analyze the welfare effects of voucher provision in the DC Opportunity Scholarship
Program (OSP), a school voucher program in Washington, DC, that randomly allocated vouchers
to students. To do so, we develop new discrete choice tools to show how to use data with random
allocation of school vouchers to characterize what we can learn about the welfare benefits of
providing a voucher of a given amount, as measured by the average willingness to pay for that
voucher, and these benefits net of the costs of providing that voucher. A novel feature of our
tools is that they allow specifying the relationship of the demand for the various schools with
respect to prices to be entirely nonparametric or to be parameterized in a flexible manner, both
of which do not necessarily imply that the welfare parameters are point identified. Applying
our tools to the OSP data, we find that provision of the status-quo as well as a wide range
of counterfactual voucher amounts has a positive net average benefit. We find these positive
results arise due to the presence of many low-tuition schools in the program, removing these
schools from the program can result in a negative net average benefit.
KEYWORDS: School vouchers, welfare analysis, program evaluation, discrete choice analysis, Op-
portunity Scholarship Progam.
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1 Introduction
School vouchers are a topic of active education policy debate across several countries. In its basic
form, they are government-funded certificates of a certain amount that parents of students can use
to offset tuition at any eligible private school of their choice. By reducing the price of private schools
and making these schools more affordable, voucher advocates argue they foster school choice that
can make voucher recipients better off (Friedman, 1962).
In recent years, a number of studies have empirically investigated this claim by estimating the
effects of vouchers on various outcomes using data from programs that randomly allocate vouchers—
see, for example, Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2018), Angrist et al. (2002), Dynarski et al. (2018), Howell
et al. (2000), Krueger and Zhu (2004), Mayer et al. (2002), Mills and Wolf (2017), Muralidharan
and Sundararaman (2015) and Wolf et al. (2010). However, as surveyed in Epple et al. (2017),
the evidence from these studies is mixed. Some find positive effects, while others find null or even
negative effects. Nonetheless, despite this mixed evidence on the benefits on outcomes, the data in
each of these studies reveals that a non-trivial proportion of recipients choose to use the voucher.
By revealed preference arguments, this suggests that recipients may in general value vouchers and
be better off across dimensions not easily captured by outcomes.
In this paper, we analyze these potential welfare benefits that recipients may experience under
the observed status-quo voucher amount as well as under alternative counterfactual amounts in
the DC Opportunity Scholarship Program (OSP). The OSP was the first federally-funded school
voucher program in the United States, which was implement in Washington, DC. It provided a
voucher of $7,500 and, due to oversubscription, randomly allocated the voucher to families. The
data from the program reveals that around 70% of the recipients choose to use the voucher, implying
that a large proportion of recipients may in fact potentially value the voucher.
Our analysis starts by showing how to generally use data with random allocation of vouchers to
characterize what we can learn about the welfare benefits of providing a voucher of a given amount.
To measure the welfare benefits of such a voucher, we use the average of individual willingness to
pay for that voucher, i.e. the amount of money an individual is willing to pay to receive that voucher
such that they are indifferent had they not received it. This measure provides a natural money
metric for the welfare benefits and, in particular, relates to the average compensating variation of
the decrease in school prices induced by the voucher. To benchmark these benefits and perform
a cost-benefit analysis, we also measure the potential costs the government may face through the
provision of the voucher.
To characterize what can learn about these quantities using the data, we develop new tools.
In our model of school choice which is entirely nonparametric, each parameter capturing these
various quantities can be expressed as functions of the demand for each school. Given the random
allocation of vouchers, the observed choices of recipients and non-recipients reveal the value of
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the demand at two prices, namely the prices with and without the application of the status-quo
voucher. However, our parameters of interest generally depend on demand values beyond these two
prices. The tools we develop aim to show how to sharply characterize what we can learn about
these parameters under a given specification of demand. We consider two demand specifications.
In the first, the demand for each school is only nonparametrically restricted to be decreasing with
its own price and increasing with the prices of other schools; whereas, in the second, the demand
is additionally allowed to be generally parameterized through a flexible functional form restriction
on how it varies with prices. For both specifications, we develop easy-to-implement computational
procedures that characterize what we can learn about our parameters.
Importantly, our procedures account for the fact that under both specifications there may not
exist a single point-identified demand but potentially multiple demand functions consistent with
the values revealed by the data. Indeed, this is generally the case unless one solely focuses attention
to arguably restrictive parametric specifications of demand. Our procedures generate the unique
parameter value in these more restrictive cases while continuing to generate the set of all parameter
values consistent with the multiple admissible demand functions in the more general case. As we
discuss below, this generality of our developed tools is a novel feature and of potential interest to
discrete choice analysis beyond the voucher setup we consider in this paper.
Applying the developed tools to the OSP data, our estimates reveal that provision of the status-
quo voucher amount can have a positive net average benefit. We find that this conclusion is robust
to several choices of flexible parametric demand specifications and continues to hold even under
the nonparametric specification. In particular, under our most flexible parametric specification, we
find that the average benefit net of costs is bounded between $1,030 and $2,931, whereas, under
the nonparametric specification, it is bounded between $333 and $5,606. For a wide range of
counterfactual voucher amounts, our estimates continue to similarly reveal that provision of the
voucher can have a positive net average benefit.
A closer inspection of the data reveals our positive findings on voucher provision arise due to
the presence of many low-tuition schools in the program. These schools potentially induce a high
welfare benefit for recipients relative to the net costs the government faces to fund a voucher when
redeemed at them. Indeed, Friedman (1962) argued a key rationale for school vouchers is that
they may subsidize private schools that provide services individuals value more efficiently than
government-funded schools. Our analysis concludes by investigating the importance of low-tuition
schools in the OSP. We estimate how the welfare effects of the status-quo voucher amount change
when removing such schools from the program. Our estimates reveal the presence of such schools
plays an essential role in explaining our positive findings, absent schools with tuition at most $3,500
in the program can result in a negative net benefit.
We primarily contribute to the literature on the evaluation of school voucher programs. As
highlighted above, most papers in this literature estimate the effects of various programs on out-
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comes. However, these estimates leave open the question on the welfare implications of these
programs. We complement these papers by providing welfare estimates of a specific program and
developing general tools that can be used to analyze programs beyond the one we study. A smaller
literature uses differentiated-products demand models to study questions of school choice related
to vouchers. These papers analyze, among other things, the changes in school quality induced by
a program (Neilson, 2013) and welfare effects of proposed policy changes (Carneiro et al., 2019).
Their analyses require exogenous variation in the data beyond the random allocation of vouchers
and a fully-parameterized model such that the underlying primitives are point-identified. We com-
plement these papers by focusing solely on the welfare effects of the voucher and showing precisely
what can be learned without the more demanding data and modeling requirements.
In developing our tools, we exploit recent advancements from the literature on nonparametric
welfare analysis in an important intermediate step. Specifically, Bhattacharya (2015, 2018) show
that the average compensating variation of a price decrease can be nonparametrically expressed as
a function of each good’s demand. If these demand functions are point identified, then one can
directly apply these results. We show how to exploit these results even when the demand functions
are not point identified. Recently, Bhattacharya (2019) also derives analytic nonparametric bounds
for welfare parameters in such cases with two goods where one of them is a numeraire good. These
results however do not straightforwardly extend to the case with multiple goods and prices. We show
how the geometry of the parameters in our context can be exploited to propose a computational
procedure that similarly derives nonparametric bounds. In addition, we also show how flexible
parametric specifications can be incorporated into the analysis. In this direction, we exploit ideas
from Mogstad et al. (2018), who show how parametric restrictions can be incorporated in an
alternative setting of a treatment effect model.
More broadly, we contribute to the growing literature on non- and semiparametric discrete choice
analysis where the underlying model primitive is not necessarily point identified—see, for example,
Chesher et al. (2013), Kamat (2019), Kitamura and Stoye (2018), Manski (2007) and Tebaldi et al.
(2019). These papers provide various tools, mostly computational, to evaluate different questions
such as estimating the effect of different prices and choice sets on demand, characterizing the
underlying utility functions, and testing the utility maximization premise of various models. We
complement this literature by providing tools to evaluate a question of interest not analyzed in
these papers, namely the average willingness to pay for a given decrease in prices.
We organize our analysis in the paper as follows. Section 2 describes our model of school choice
and demand specifications we consider. Section 3 defines the parameters we use to measure the
welfare benefits as well as the costs of voucher provision. Section 4 characterizes what we can learn
about our parameters. Section 5 presents our empirical results on the OSP. Section 6 concludes.
Proofs of all results along with additional details pertinent to our analysis are presented in the
Supplementary Appendix.
3
2 Model of School Choice
Suppose the set of schools where individuals can enroll can be partitioned into government-funded
schools and private schools that do and do not participate in the voucher program. Let Jg denote
the set of government-funded schools, Jn denote the set of private schools not participating in the
voucher program, and Jv denote the set of private schools participating in the voucher program.
The status-quo voucher program provides an amount of at most τsq ∈ R+ to cover the price (the
tuition) for any school in Jv. For the jth school in Jv, let p∗j ∈ R+ denote its original price
before applying the voucher and let pj(τ) ∈ R+ denote its price after applying a voucher of amount
τ ∈ R+, where these two prices are related by the relationship
pj(τ) = max{0, p∗j − τ} . (1)
Under this notation, the original price and that under the status-quo amount for the jth school in Jv
are given by pj(0) and pj (τsq), respectively. For notational convenience, we use Js = Jg∪Jn∪Jv to
denote the set of all schools. In addition, we take Jv = {1, . . . , J}, where the schools in this list are
ordered in terms of their original prices, i.e. p∗1 ≤ . . . ≤ p∗J , and we take p(τ) = (p1(τ), . . . , pJ(τ))
to denote the vector of prices for these schools under a voucher of amount τ .
For a given individual, we observe Z and D, which respectively denote an indicator for whether
the individual received a voucher and the school in Js where the individual enrolled. We assume
that the observed enrollment choice is the product of an underlying utility maximization decision.
To this end, let Yj denote the individual’s underlying disposable income under the jth school in Jg
or Jn and let Uj(Yj) denote the corresponding indirect utility under that school. For the schools in
Jv, we can define similar quantities but we need to explicitly account for the role their prices play
as they are altered by the receipt of the voucher. Specifically, let Yj − pj denote the individual’s
underlying disposable income under the jth school in Jv had the price of that school been set to
pj ∈ R+, and let Uj(Yj − pj) denote the corresponding indirect utility under that school given
that price. Using these quantities, we can define the individual’s utility maximizing choice had the
prices of the schools in Jv been set to the vector p = (p1, . . . , pJ) by
D(p) =

arg max
j∈Jg∪Jn
Uj(Yj) if max
j∈Jg∪Jn
Uj(Yj) > max
j∈Jv
Uj(Yj − pj) ,
arg max
j∈Jv
Uj(Yj − pj) if max
j∈Jg∪Jn
Uj(Yj) ≤ max
j∈Jv
Uj(Yj − pj) .
The observed enrollment choice is then assumed to be related to the underlying utility maximizing
choices and voucher receipt by the relationship
D = D (p(τsq)) · Z +D (p(0)) · (1− Z) . (2)
Our analysis is based on the demand functions for the different schools in the sense that we use
them to state our assumptions and define our parameters of interest. Let P =
J∏
j=1
[0, pj(0)] ⊂ RJ+
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denote the domain of price vectors for the schools in Jv over which we define these functions. Then,
for a given p ∈ P, let
qj(p|z) = Prob{D(p) = j|Z = z} ,
qg(p|z) = Prob{D(p) ∈ Jg|Z = z} ,
qn(p|z) = Prob{D(p) ∈ Jn|Z = z}
respectively define the demand for the jth school in Jv, for any school in Jg and for any school in
Jn, conditional on the receipt of the voucher Z = z ∈ {0, 1}. Analogously, let
qj(p) = Prob{D(p) = j} ,
qg(p) = Prob{D(p) ∈ Jg} ,
qn(p) = Prob{D(p) ∈ Jn}
respectively define the unconditional demand for the jth school in Jv, for any school in Jg and
for any school in Jn. Note we only define demand for any school in Jg and Jn, and not for each
specific school in these sets of schools. As we will observe, this is because defining demand over this
more parsimonious grouping is sufficient for the definition of our welfare parameters. For notational
convenience, let J = {g, n} ∪ Jv denote the set of indices over which the demand functions are
defined.
In the following assumption, we state the restrictions we impose on the demand functions under
our baseline specification. In particular, note that this specification is entirely nonparametric.
Assumption B. (Baseline)
(i) For each j ∈ J , qj(p|z) = qj(p) for all p ∈ P and z ∈ {0, 1}.
(ii) For each j ∈ J , qj is weakly increasing in pi for each i 6= j ∈ Jv.
Assumption B(i) states that the demand functions are invariant to the receipt of the voucher. It
follows from this assumption that the underlying demand functions can be uniquely captured by
the vector q ≡ (qg, qn, q1, . . . , qJ) of unconditional demand functions. As a result, in the remainder
of our analysis, we focus solely on the unconditional demand; whenever we refer to demand, it
is understood we are referring to the unconditional demand. Assumption B(ii) imposes shape
restrictions on how demand behaves with the prices of the private schools in the voucher program.
In particular, it imposes that for each p, p ∈ P such that pj > p′j for j ∈ J ′ ⊆ Jv and pj = p′j for
j ∈ Jv \ J ′, we have that
qj(p) ≥ qj(p′) (3)
for each j ∈ J \ J ′. Since by definition we have that
qj(p) = 1−
∑
i∈J\{j}
qi(p)
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for each j ∈ Jv, note that it also directly follows from Assumption B(ii) that qj is weakly decreasing
in pj for j ∈ Jv, i.e. the standard shape restriction from demand theory that states demand for
each good is weakly decreasing with respect to its own price. While the above assumptions impose
restrictions directly on the demand functions, note that each of these restrictions follows from
restrictions imposed on the underlying variables of the model. For example, Assumption B(i)
follows from assuming the voucher to be randomly allocated, i.e. Z is statistically independent of
the remaining variables of the model. On the other hand, Assumption B(ii) follows from assuming
Uj to be weakly or strongly increasing for each j ∈ Js.
A common approach in the literature on discrete choice analysis is to consider specifications
that place parametric functional form restrictions on the demand functions—see, for example, Train
(2009, Chapter 2) for a textbook introduction on such parameterizations. These specifications are
often chosen to ensure that the demand functions are point identified. In our analysis, we also
consider auxiliary specifications that impose such parametric restrictions in addition to those in
Assumption B, but we do not restrict attention to only those that ensure point identification. In
the following assumption, we state the general class of parametric specifications we consider.
Assumption A. (Auxiliary) For each j ∈ J ,
qj(p) =
Kj∑
k=0
αjk · bjk(p) (4)
for some {αjk : 0 ≤ k ≤ Kj}, where {bjk : 0 ≤ k ≤ Kj} denote some known functions.
Assumption A states that the demand functions are linear functions of some known functions of
prices, where the variable α ≡ (α′g, α′n, α′1, . . . , α′J)′ , with αj = (αj1, . . . , αjKj)′ for each j ∈ J ,
parameterizes the demand functions. As we further discuss in Section 4.3, this assumption allows
for several types of flexible parametric specifications. For example, it allows for those that result
in point identification of the demand functions such as
qj(p) = αj0 + αj1 · pj for j ∈ Jv , (5)
qj(p) = αj0 for j ∈ {g, n} , (6)
for some {αjk : j ∈ Jv, 0 ≤ k ≤ 1} and {αj0 : j ∈ {g, n}}, i.e. the demand for voucher schools are
linear functions of their own prices and the demand for any government or non-voucher school
is constant—see Appendix S.2.1 for details on how this specification imposes restrictions simi-
lar to those imposed by a logit specification and—like the logit—achieves point identification of
the demand functions. However, Assumption A also allows for more flexible specifications with
smoother polynomial functions in own prices as well as prices of all schools, which do not imply
point identification.
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3 Welfare Effects of Voucher Provision
In the context of our model, the provision of a voucher can make individuals better off by increasing
their disposable income when enrolled in schools in the voucher program. In this section, we
define the main parameter of interest of our analysis that aims to quantify these potential welfare
benefits. We define this parameter for a generic voucher amount of τ ∈ R+. As mentioned below,
this generality, by choosing alternative values of τ , allows us to analyze the welfare effects of the
status-quo voucher amount as well as alternative counterfactual voucher amounts.
To quantify the benefit for a given individual, we use a money metric for the welfare gains from
the receipt of the voucher. Specifically, we use the amount of money that the individual would pay
to receive the voucher or, equivalently, the negative of the compensating variation of the reduction
in prices induced by the voucher. Formally, the individual’s willingness to pay for a voucher of
amount τ is defined by the variable B(τ) that solves
max
{
max
j∈Jg∪Jn
Uj(Yj), max
j∈Jv
Uj (Yj − pj(0))
}
= (7)
max
{
max
j∈Jg∪Jn
Uj(Yj −B(τ)), max
j∈Jv
Uj (Yj − pj(t)−B(τ))
}
,
i.e. the amount of money to be subtracted from the individual’s income under the receipt of the
voucher so that they obtain the same utility as that in the absence of the voucher. We then quantify
the average benefit of a voucher that provides an amount of τ by
AB(τ) = E[B(τ)] , (8)
i.e. the average willingness to pay to receive the voucher amount of τ .
As mentioned, our analysis is based on the fact that our parameters of interest can be written as
functions of the demand functions introduced in the previous section. In order to show this for the
average benefit parameter defined above, we exploit results from Bhattacharya (2015, 2018) who
showed in a more general setup that the average value of a variable such as that defined in (7) can
be written as a closed form expression of the demand functions. In the following proposition, we
formally state this result in terms of our setup and notation. In the statement of this proposition,
we use j(τ) to denote the jth school in Jv such that pj(τ)(0) < τ and pj(τ)+1(0) ≥ τ , i.e. the
last school in Jv for which the voucher amount τ is strictly greater than the tuition amount. In
addition, we take {al(τ) : 0 ≤ l ≤ J} to be a set of values such that a0(τ) = 0, al(τ) = pl(0) for
1 ≤ l ≤ j(τ) and al(τ) = τ for l > j(τ).
Proposition 3.1. Suppose Uj is continuous and strictly increasing for each j ∈ Js. Then we have
7
that B(τ) defined in (7) exists and is unique, and that
E[B(τ)] =
j(τ)∑
l=0
al+1(τ)∫
al(t)
 J∑
j=l+1
qj (p1(0), . . . , pl(0), pl+1(τ) + a, . . . , pJ(τ) + a)
 da . (9)
While voucher provision can have benefits, it can also be costly to the government who finances
the voucher. To benchmark the benefits and perform a cost-benefit analysis, we therefore also
consider parameters that measure these potential costs. To this end, observe that the provision of
a voucher introduces costs to the government when individuals enroll in a school in the program,
but can also brings about savings depending on the costs the government faces under schools where
individuals enroll in the absence of the voucher. To formally capture these net costs, let cj(τ)
denote the cost that the government associates with the jth demand function in J under a voucher
of amount τ . For example, in our baseline empirical analysis, we take
cj(τ) =

cg for j = Jg ,
0 for j = Jn ,
min{pj(0), τ} for j ∈ Jv ,
i.e. the cost associated with each government-funded school is some known value cg, the cost
associated with each private school not participating in the program is zero, and the cost associated
with each private school participating in the program is the voucher amount spent to cover tuition.
We then measure the average net costs from the provision of a voucher of amount τ by
AC(τ) =
∑
j∈J
cj(τ) · qj(p(τ))−
∑
j∈J
cj(0) · qj(p(0)) , (10)
i.e. the average costs the government faces when individuals receive the voucher net of those it
faces when individuals do not receive the voucher. Along with the average benefit parameter, we
can then also define the average surplus parameter, which can be used to perform a cost-benefit
analysis. Specifically, for a voucher amount of τ , let
AS(τ) = AB(τ)−AC(τ) (11)
denote the average surplus of the voucher, i.e. the average benefit across individuals of receiving
the voucher net of the average cost for the government of providing that voucher. Note that the
average cost parameter is a function of q and, since the average benefit parameter is a function of
q, so is the average surplus parameter.
The benefit, cost and surplus parameters we described above were defined for a generic voucher
amount of τ . By taking different values of τ , we can evaluate these parameters for both the status-
quo voucher amount as well as alternative counterfactual amounts. More specifically, by taking
τ = τsq, we can evaluate these parameters for the status-quo voucher amount, whereas, by taking
8
τ = τc 6= τsq, we can evaluate these parameters for a counterfactual amount of τc. In our analysis,
we also study the difference of the parameters under these amounts, i.e.
∆AB (τc) = AB (τc)−AB (τsq) , (12)
∆AC (τc) = AC (τc)−AC (τsq) , (13)
∆AS (τc) = AS (τc)−AS (τsq) , (14)
which allows us to directly compare the benefit, cost and surplus between the counterfactual and
status-quo voucher amounts.
4 Identification Analysis
In the previous section, we described our parameters of interest and noted that each of them was a
function of the demand functions. In this section, we study what we can learn about each of these
parameters given what we know about the demand functions from the imposed assumptions and
data.
4.1 General Setup
We begin by formally describing the general setup for the identification analysis we develop below.
To this end, let θ(q) denote a pre-specified parameter of interest from Section 3 that we want to
learn about.
Since θ is a known function, it follows what we can learn about our parameter depends on
what we know about the function q. As q is defined to be a function whose image is a vector of
probabilities, we know by construction that for each p ∈ P we have
0 ≤ qj(p) ≤ 1 for each j ∈ J , (15)∑
j∈J
qj(p) = 1 , (16)
i.e., for all prices, each demand function lies in the unit interval and their sum together equals one.
Under our baseline specification, we know that q satisfies Assumption B(ii), i.e. it satisfies the
nonparametric shape restrictions stated in (3). Under our auxiliary specifications, we additionally
know that q satisfies Assumption A, i.e. it satisfies the parametric restrictions stated in (4). Finally,
under both specifications, the data also restricts the values that q can take. Specifically, it follows
from (2) and Assumption B(i) that the data reveals
qj(p(0)) = Prob[D = j|Z = 0] ≡ Pj|0 , (17)
qj (p (τsq)) = Prob[D = j|Z = 1] ≡ Pj|1 (18)
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for j ∈ Jv , and
qj(p(0)) = Prob[D ∈ Jj |Z = 0] ≡ Pj|0 , (19)
qj (p (τsq)) = Prob[D ∈ Jj |Z = 1] ≡ Pj|1 (20)
for j ∈ {g, n}, i.e. the enrollment shares across schools conditional on the receipt of voucher reveal
the values the demand functions take at the vector of prices with and without the status-quo
voucher amount. To summarize the above information on what we know about q, let F denote the
set of all functions from P to R|J |. Then, let
QB = {q ∈ F : q satisfies (15)− (16), (3) and (17)− (20)} (21)
denote the admissible set of all demand functions that satisfy the various restrictions imposed by
the assumptions and data under our baseline specification, and let
QA = {q ∈ F : q satisfies (15)− (16), (3), (4) and (17)− (20)} (22)
denote the analogous set of such demand functions under our auxiliary specification.
Given what we know about q, our objective is to characterize what we can then learn about our
parameter θ(q). In some cases, observe that there exists a single admissible value of q under the
chosen specification. In such cases, it follows that we can exactly learn value of θ(q). For example,
as we noted before, this is the case under the specification described in (5)-(6). However, under
more flexible parametric specifications as well as the baseline nonparametric specification, there
generally exist multiple admissible values of q. In these more general cases, it follows that we can
learn a set of values that θ(q) may potentially lie in.
Our analysis aims to show what we can learn across both these two cases. We generally do so
by showing how to characterize the identified set. Formally, for a given admissible set of demand
functions Q, the identified set is defined by
θ(Q) = {θ0 ∈ R : θ(q) = θ0 for some q ∈ Q} ≡ Θ , (23)
i.e. the image of the set of admissible functions Q under the function θ. Intuitively, the identified
set corresponds to the set of all parameter values that could have been generated by the admissible
values of q. By construction, it sharply captures all that we can learn about the parameter given
the data and the chosen specification. Indeed, if the parameter is point identified then the identified
set corresponds to a single point. Alternatively, if the parameter is partially identified then the
identified set corresponds to the sharpest set of all possible parameter values consistent with the
data and specification.
In what follows, we develop procedures to compute the identified set under each of our speci-
fications: first, in Section 4.2, under our baseline specification, i.e. Θ in (23) when Q = QB; and
then, in Section 4.3, under our auxiliary specification, i.e. Θ in (23) when Q = QA.
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4.2 Identified Set under Baseline Nonparametric Specification
In principle, observe that characterizing the identified set corresponds to searching over the various
q in Q and taking their image under the function θ. Under the baseline specification, this problem
can be challenging due to the fact that QB is an infinite-dimensional space. Below, we show how
to feasibly proceed in this case. In particular, we exploit the idea that we can replace QB by a
finite-dimensional space QfdB without any loss of information with respect to what we can learn
about the parameter in the sense that θ(QB) = θ
(
QfdB
)
. This allows us to indirectly characterize
the identified set by searching only through q in QfdB , which is a finite-dimensional problem and,
hence, potentially feasible in practice.
We begin by defining the finite-dimensional space QfdB we consider. In order to do so, we need
to first define a collection of sets that plays a key role in the subsequent definition of QfdB . To this
end, observe that
Pl(τ) = {p ∈ P : pj = min{pj(0), pj(τ) + a} for a ∈ [al(τ), al+1(τ)] for each j ∈ Jv} (24)
for 0 ≤ l ≤ j(τ) correspond to the various sets of prices that play a role in the definition of the
parameter AB(τ), and
{p(0), p (τsq) , p(τ)} (25)
corresponds to the set of prices that play a role in the definition of the parameter AC(τ) as well as
the data restrictions in (17)-(20). Note it then follows that
P∗ =
j(τsq)⋃
l=0
Pl (τsq)
j(τc)⋃
l=0
Pl (τc)
⋃
{p(0), p (τsq) , p (τc)} (26)
corresponds to the subset of P that plays a role in the definition of all parameters for the status-quo
voucher amount and a counterfactual voucher amount of τc along with the restrictions imposed by
the data. Given this set of prices, we define in the following definition the collection of sets U that
we later use below in the definition of QfdB .
Definition 4.1. Let U = {u1, . . . , uM} denote a finite partition of the set of prices P∗ in (26) such
that for all u ∈ U we have either
(i) u = {p ∈ P : pj = min{pj(0), pj(τ) + a} for a ∈ (au, a¯u] or (au, a¯u) for each j ∈ Jv} where
au and a¯u are such that u ⊆ Pl(t) for some 0 ≤ l ≤ j(τ) and τ ∈ {τsq, τc}; or
(ii) u = {p (τ)} for some τ ∈ {0, τsq, τc} ,
and for all u, u′ ∈ U we have either
u(j) = u′(j) or u(j) ∩ u′(j) = ∅ (27)
for each j ∈ Jv, where u(j) = {t ∈ R : pj = t for some p ∈ u} for each u ∈ U and j ∈ Jv.
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Figure 1: Various sets of prices for an example with J = 2 and τsq < p1(0) < τc < p2(0)
p(0)
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p2(0)
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p1(0)
0 p1(0)p1(τsq)
(a) Sets that play a role in defining the pa-
rameters and data restrictions
p2
p1
u11
u10
u9
u7
u6
u3
u4
u5
u2
0
u8
u1
u12
(b) A partition U of the union of sets in (a)
that satisfies Definition 4.1
Definition 4.1 states that U corresponds to a finite partition of P∗, where each element of the
partition satisfies a specific property. In particular, Definition 4.1(i)-(ii) states that each element is
a set that corresponds to a connected subset of that in (24) or (25). In addition, it states in (27) that
any pair of sets in this partition are such that they either completely overlap or are disjoint in each
price coordinate. Intuitively, this latter property implies that the sets can be ordered across the
prices of each voucher school, which will allow the finite-dimensional space we consider to preserve
the information provided by the shape restrictions in (3).
To better understand these various set of prices, Figure 1(a) first graphically illustrates the
sets of prices in (24) and (25) in the context of a simple example with two voucher schools and a
specific combination of status-quo and counterfactual voucher amounts. Figure 1(b) then shows
how the union of the sets in Figure 1(a) can be partitioned to obtain a collection of sets satisfying
Definition 4.1. In particular, it sequentially divides any two sets in Figure 1(a) that partially
overlap in a given coordinate until the condition in (27) is satisfied. In Appendix S.2.2, we describe
a computational procedure sequentially dividing sets in such a manner that can be used to obtain
a partition satisfying Definition 4.1 in the case of more than two goods.
Using the above defined collection of sets, we can now define QfdB . In particular, it is based on
a specific parameterization of q constructed using U . To define this parameterization, observe that
for each j ∈ Jv, the collection of sets determined by the prices in u ∈ U for the jth school, i.e.
{u(j) : u ∈ U}, generates a partition of [pj(min{τsq, τc}), pj(0)] ⊆ [0, pj(0)]. Given this implies that
Uj = {[0, pj(min{τsq, τc}))}
⋃ {u(j) : u ∈ U} corresponds to a partition of [0, pj(0)] for each j ∈ Jv,
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observe that
W =
J∏
j=1
Uj ≡ {w1, . . . , wN} ,
denotes a partition of the space of prices P over which q is defined, where, for each element of the
partition, the prices for the jth school in Jv take values in a set that corresponds to an element of
Uj . Then, using this partition, we take
QfdB =
{
q ∈ QB : qj(p) =
∑
w∈W
1w(p) · βj(w) for some {βj(w)}w∈W for each j ∈ J
}
, (28)
where 1w(p) ≡ 1{p ∈ w}, i.e. the space we consider corresponds to a subset of QB such that each
q is parameterized to be a constant function over the elements of the partition W.
We next show that replacing with QB with this choice of Q
fd
B leads to no loss of information with
respect to what we can learn about the parameter of interest, i.e. θ (QB) = θ
(
QfdB
)
. In addition,
we also show that characterizing θ
(
QfdB
)
, which is a finite-dimensional problem, can be solved using
two finite-dimensional optimization problems. In order to state this result, it useful to first restate
θ
(
QfdB
)
in terms of the variable β ≡ (β′g, β′n, β′1, . . . , β′J)′ , where βj = (βj(w1), . . . , βj(wN )) for
each j ∈ J , that parameterizes a given q ∈ QfdB . To this end, note that given each parameter θ
is continuous in q and that q is continuous in β, it follows that θ can be written in terms of a
continuous function of β in the sense that there exists a continuous function θB of β such that
θ(q) = θB(β). Similarly, note that QB can also be written in terms of β by
B =
{
β ∈ Rdβ :
(∑
w∈W
1w · βj(w) : j ∈ J
)
∈ QB
}
, (29)
where dβ denotes the dimension of β, i.e. the set of values of β that ensure that the corresponding
q is in QB. Then, we can write θ
(
QfdB
)
in terms of β by
{θ0 ∈ R : θB(β) = θ0 for some β ∈ B} ≡ ΘB . (30)
In the following proposition, we state the result that the identified set under the baseline specifica-
tion, i.e. Θ in (23) when Q = QB, is equal to ΘB. In addition, the proposition also shows that we
can characterize ΘB by solving two finite-dimensional optimization problems.
Proposition 4.1. Suppose that Q = QB. Then, the identified set in (23) is equal to that in (30),
i.e. Θ = ΘB. In addition, if B is empty then by definition ΘB is empty; whereas, if B is non-empty
then ΘB = [θB, θ¯B], where
θB = min
β∈B
θB(β) and θ¯B = max
β∈B
θB(β) . (31)
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Proposition 4.1 shows that the identified set under the baseline specification when not empty
is given by a closed interval, where the endpoints can be obtained by solving the two optimization
problems stated in (31). In the proof of the proposition, we explicitly derive B, the constraint
set of these optimization problems, and observe that it is determined by constraints that are all
linear in β. In addition, we also explicitly derive θB, the objectives of these optimization problems,
for each of our parameters of interest and observe that they all correspond to linear functions
of β. These two observations then imply that these optimization problems are, in fact, linear
programming problems, a useful observation in their practical implementation. Lastly, observe
that to characterize the identified set using these linear programs, we specifically require that B is
non-empty or, equivalently, that the model is not misspecified. However, when this is not the case,
note the same linear programs automatically terminate and, in turn, also automatically indicate
when the model is misspecified.
While the optimization problems in (31) are linear programs, they can nonetheless be compu-
tationally expensive in cases where the dimension of the optimizing variable β is large. Such a
case arises especially in settings when J is large as in our empirical analysis, where we have that
J is equal to 68. To ensure tractability in such cases, it is useful to consider alternative lower-
dimensional linear programs that are easier to compute and can continue to allow us to learn about
our parameters. To this end, observe that, given how U captured all sets relevant in defining our
parameters, only a restricted subset of W given by
Wr =
w ∈ W : w =
J∏
j=1
u(j) for some u ∈ U
 ≡ {wr1, . . . , wrNr} ,
corresponds to the sets of prices that play a role in the definition of our parameters. In turn, observe
that only a subvector of β defined over these sets given by βr =
(
βrg
′, βrn′, βr1′, . . . , βrJ
′)′ ≡ φ(β), where
βrj =
(
βj(w
r
1), . . . , βj(w
r
Nr)
)
for each j ∈ J , plays a role in the determining θB in the sense that there
equivalently exists a linear function θrB such that θ
r
B(β
r) = θB(β). Then, the lower-dimensional
linear programs we consider are those in terms of the subvector βr given by
θrB = min
βr∈Br
θrB(β
r) and θ¯rB = max
βr∈Br
θrB(β
r) , (32)
where Br denotes a set of βr determined by linear constraints. By an appropriate choice of Br,
these alternative linear programs can continue to allow us to learn about our parameters. To see
how, observe first that if Br = φ(B), we have by construction that these programs are equivalent
to those in (31). In turn, by taking Br to be such that φ(B) ⊆ Br, it follows that we have θrB ≤ θB
and θ¯rB ≥ θ¯B, and can therefore continue to learn about our parameters by obtaining a set that
contains the identified set, i.e. ΘB ∈
[
θrB, θ¯
r
B
]
. In Appendix S.2.3, we provide a natural choice of
such a Br determined by restrictions on βr implied by those in B, which we find in our empirical
analysis can be tractably implemented and also result in informative conclusions.
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4.3 Identified Set under Auxiliary Parametric Specifications
We now proceed to show how to characterize the identified set under our auxiliary specification.
Under this specification, in contrast to the baseline, note that the problem is finite-dimensional in
nature due to the fact that QA is a finite-dimensional parameterized space. As a result, in this
case, the identified set can be directly characterized by searching over q in QA and then taking
their image under the function θ.
In order to state the result that shows how to do this, it useful to first restate the identified set
in terms of the variable α that parameterizes a given q ∈ QA through (4). Given each parameter θ
is continuous in q and that q is continuous in α, note that it follows that θ can be written in terms
of a continuous function of α in the sense that there exists a continuous function θA of α such that
θ(q) = θA(α). Similarly, note that QA can also be written in terms of α by
A =
α ∈ Rdα :
 Kj∑
k=0
αjk · bjk : j ∈ J
 ∈ QB
 . (33)
where dα denotes the dimension of α, i.e. the set of values of α that ensure that the corresponding
q is in QB. Then, the identified set under the auxiliary specification, i.e. Θ in (23) when Q = QA,
can equivalently be given by
θA(A) = {θ0 ∈ R : θA(α) = θ0 for some α ∈ A} ≡ ΘA , (34)
i.e. the image of the set A under the function θA. In the following proposition, we show that when
A is connected and non-empty, the closure of this set is equal to an interval, where the endpoints
can be characterized as solutions to two finite dimensional optimization problems.
Proposition 4.2. If A is empty then by definition ΘA is empty; whereas, if A is connected and
non-empty, then the closure of ΘA is given by [θA, θ¯A], where
θA = inf
α∈A
θA(α) and θ¯A = sup
α∈A
θA(α) . (35)
Proposition 4.2 shows how to characterize the identified set under a general class of parametric
restrictions. As we mentioned before, this class allows various types of more flexible versions of
the parametric specification in (5)-(6) that ensured point identification of the demand functions.
We conclude this section by discussing three types of such specifications we later consider in our
empirical analysis that can be implemented using Proposition 4.2.
Assumption O. (Own-price) For each j ∈ Jv,
qj(p) =
K∑
k=0
αjk · pkj
for some {αjk : 0 ≤ k ≤ K}, and for each j ∈ {g, n}, qj(p) = αj0 for some αj0.
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Assumption AS. (Additively Separable) For each j ∈ J ,
qj(p) =
J∑
i=1
K∑
k=0
αjik · pki
for some {αjik : i ∈ Jv, 0 ≤ k ≤ K}.
Assumption NS. (Nonseparable) For each j ∈ J ,
qj(p) =
J∑
i=1
i 6=j
K∑
k=0
K∑
l=0
αjikl · pkj · pli
for some {αjikl : i ∈ Jv, 0 ≤ k, l ≤ K}, and for each j ∈ {g, n},
qj(p) =
J∑
i=1
K∑
k=0
αjik · pki
for some {αjik : i ∈ Jv, 0 ≤ k ≤ K}.
Assumption O states that the demand for each j ∈ Jv is a function of only its own price, where this
function is a polynomial of degree K, and that the demand for each j ∈ {g, n} is a constant function.
When K is equal one, note that this corresponds to the linear specification in (5)-(6). However,
for larger values of K, it allows for more smooth and flexible patterns in prices. Nonetheless, while
more flexible, it can still be viewed as restrictive as it assumes the demand for a given school to be
constant across changes in prices of other schools. To this end, Assumption AS and Assumption NS
consider more flexible parametric specifications that allow the demand for each school to depend
on the prices of all voucher schools. Assumption AS takes the demand for each j ∈ J to be an
additively separable function in the prices of each j ∈ Jv, where these functions are polynomials of
degree K. Assumption NS further parsimoniously relaxes the requirement of additive separability
by allowing for nonseparability in its own price. In particular, it takes the demand for j ∈ Jv to
be an additively separable function only in the prices of each i ∈ Jv \ {j}, where these bivariate
functions are bivariate polynomials of degree K.
As we illustrate in Appendix S.2.4, each of these specifications can be implemented through
Proposition 4.2 by rewriting them using the Bernstein polynomial basis. In particular, under this
basis, we can explicitly write A in a straightforward manner in terms of a system of linear equality
and inequality restrictions on α. Moreover, we can also explicitly write θA for each of our parameters
in terms of a linear function of α. As a result, similar to (31), since the optimization problems in
(35) have linear objectives as well a constraint set determined by a linear system of equations, it
follows that they correspond to linear programming problems.
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5 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we now use the tools developed in the previous sections to estimate the welfare
effects of the DC Opportunity Scholarship Program.
5.1 The DC Opportunity Scholarship Program
We begin by providing some brief background information on the program. The DC Opportunity
Scholarship Program (OSP) was a federally-funded school voucher program established by a con-
gressional act in January 2004, and started accepting students for the 2004-2005 school year. The
OSP was structured similarly to other voucher programs that existed at the time (Epple et al.,
2017). It was open to students residing in Washington, DC, and whose family income was no
higher than 185% of the federal poverty line ($18,850 for a family of four in 2004 dollars). It could
be used only for K-12 education, and at the time of initial receipt was renewable for up to five
years. It provided students a voucher amount of $7,500 that could be used to offset tuition, fees,
and transportation to any private school of their choice participating in the program.
The congressional act that established the program also mandated its evaluation, which culmi-
nated with a final report to Congress (Wolf et al., 2010). The report exploited the fact that the
OSP randomly allocated vouchers to participating students. In particular, congress expected the
program to be oversubscribed, i.e. the number of applicants would exceed the number of available
slots in participating private schools. As a result, it required vouchers be allocated randomly to
applicants through a lottery whenever the program was oversubscribed—see Wolf et al. (2010) for
details on the lottery. Wolf et al. (2010) exploited this random allocation by comparing various
outcome of voucher recipients to non-recipients to experimentally evaluate the effect of voucher
receipt on these outcomes. The main findings from this report, as listed in its executive summary,
can be broadly summarized as follows. First, they find that there is no conclusive evidence that
the receipt of the voucher had any significant effects on various outcomes corresponding to student
achievement. Second, they find that the receipt of the voucher had significant effects on improving
students’ chances of graduating from high school. Finally, they find that the receipt of the voucher
raised parents’ ratings of school safety and satisfaction.
In what follows, we use the tools developed in the previous sections to complement these findings
by analyzing the welfare effects of providing the status-quo voucher amount as well as alternative
counterfactual amounts. Our analysis is based on the premise that while the receipt of the voucher
revealed mixed evidence on outcomes in the sense that there are zero as well as some positive effects,
parents may nonetheless value the voucher, potentially across dimensions not easily captured by
the outcomes. Indeed, as we highlight below, the data from the program reveals that a non-trivial
proportion of voucher recipients used the voucher, which, by revealed preference arguments, implies
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Table 1: Enrollment shares across school type by voucher receipt
With voucher Without voucher Difference
Government-funded 0.296 0.910 -0.614
Non-participating private 0.006 0.011 -0.005
Participating private 0.698 0.079 0.619
Observations 1,090 730
Notes: Observations rounded to the nearest 10.
SOURCE: Evaluation of the DC Opportunity Scholarship Program: Final Report (NCEE
2010-4018), U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics pre-
viously unpublished tabulations.
that recipients may value receiving the voucher. Our analysis below estimates these potential
welfare benefits using data collected by the OSP.
5.2 Data and Summary Statistics
The OSP collected detailed data for the first two years of the program, namely 2004 and 2005, and
tracked students for at least four years. Across these years, the school settings were different—the
composition of applicants and private schools participating in the program changed. Wolf et al.
(2010) provide a detailed description on how the data was collected and various statistics of the
school setting in the various years. In our analysis, we focus on the second year of the program,
i.e. 2005, as it corresponded to the largest year of the evaluation, around 80% of the entire sample.
In addition, we focus on the initial year of the data for students entering the program this year.
As we discuss in Section 6, this avoids complications that arise from the dynamics of the setup.
In Appendices S.3.1-S.3.2, we provide details on how our analysis sample was constructed from
the original evaluation data and some statistics on the school setting. Below, we present summary
statistics for the main variables from the data our analysis exploits, namely the enrollments shares
and the prices as measured by the tuition of private schools participating in the program.
Table 1 presents the empirical enrollment shares across any of the three types of schools, i.e.
government-funded schools (which includes charter schools) and private schools participating and
not participating in the program, by voucher receipt. Observe the proportion of voucher recipients
who use the voucher, corresponding to those enrolled in participating private schools, is relatively
large (69.8%). As noted above, this implies, by revealed preference, that recipients value the
voucher. In addition, observe the large difference in the proportion enrolling in participating private
schools with and without the voucher (61.9%), which suggests that prices play an important role
in inducing private school enrollment. Finally, observe the difference in the proportion enrolled
in government-funded schools with and without the voucher (-61.4%), which reveals that a large
proportion of those induced into participating private schools by the voucher (91.2% out of 61.9%)
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Figure 2: Prices and enrollment shares by voucher receipt across participating private schools
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SOURCE: Evaluation of the DC Opportunity Scholarship Program: Final Report (NCEE 2010-4018), U.S. Depart-
ment of Education, National Center for Education Statistics previously unpublished tabulations.
would be in government-funded schools absent the voucher.
In 2005, there were 68 private schools participating in the program (out of a total of 109).
Figure 2 presents histograms that summarize the variation in prices across these schools as well as
the enrollment shares across these prices. Figure 2(a) reveals that a large number of participating
private schools had low prices—around 80% had prices below the status-quo voucher amount.
Figure 2(b) reveals that the voucher induced a significant proportion to enroll in these low-price
schools—out of the 61.9% increase in the number of students attending a participating private
school, a full 59% (97%) of which was into schools with prices less than the status-quo voucher
amount. As we highlight below, these observations play an important role in better understanding
the welfare effects our analysis estimates.
To also provide some evidence on why recipients may be choosing participating private schools
and, in turn, value the voucher, Table S.2 in Appendix S.3.2 presents characteristics of these schools
along with government-funded schools, those where the majority of recipients would have enrolled
absent the voucher. These sets of schools differ across several attributes. The private schools tend
to be more religious and specifically Catholic, have lower school sizes, have more students tracked by
ability, and lower learning difficulties program. This suggests recipients may value these attributes
and, hence, the voucher that makes these schools more affordable. However, our analysis directly
estimates the welfare effects of the voucher and does not quantify the effect of these attributes on
school valuations. The latter analysis usually requires more demanding variation in the data and
modeling assumptions beyond what our analysis exploits—see Neilson (2013) and Carneiro et al.
(2019) for examples of such an analysis.
Recall from Section 3 that our analysis also uses a value of cg for the costs the government faces
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when a student enrolls in government-funded schools. In our main analysis, we take cg = $5,355,
which corresponds to the educational expenditure reported by the US Census (2005). This is
lower than total per-pupil expenditure ($12,979, which includes some fixed costs), or educational
expenditure as measured in other sources ($8,105, Sable and Hill (2006)). However, given that
our surplus parameters are increasing in cg, we choose the smaller, more conservative value. As
a sensitivity analysis, we also present results for a range of other values. For our baseline cost
value of $5,355, Figure 2(b) reveals that a large proportion of recipients (81%) redeem the voucher
at schools with prices below this value. Given that Table 1 revealed that the majority of these
recipients would have enrolled in government-funded schools absent the voucher, this suggests, as
our estimates below more precisely capture, that the government can potentially experience small
net costs or even savings by the provision of a voucher.
5.3 Welfare Estimates for the Status-quo Voucher Amount
We now present the results of our analysis that estimates the welfare effects of providing the
status-quo voucher amount as well as alternative counterfactual amounts. Table 2 first presents the
estimates for the status-quo voucher amount. Each row of the table corresponds to a parameter
from (8), (10) or (11) taking τ = τsq ≡ $7, 500, whereas each column corresponds to a specification
of demand, which is either the baseline nonparametric specification defined by Assumption B or
an auxiliary parametric specification that additionally imposes either Assumption O, Assumption
AS or Assumption NS for some value of K. We consider K = 1, 2, 3. The estimates under the
nonparametric specification are computed using the optimization problems in (32) with the choice
of Br described in Appendix S.2.3 and those under the parametric specifications are computed using
the optimization problems in (35), where in both cases the enrollment shares in the restrictions in
(17)-(20) are replaced by their empirical counterparts.
The empty sets reveal that some of the specifications may be misspecified. Specifically, the
specification in (5)-(6) in Column (2) that implies point identification of the demand function
as well as more flexible versions in the form of Assumption O in Columns (3) and (4) may be
misspecified. Too see why this arises, observe that Assumption O requires qg(p) and qn(p) to be
constant for all values of p, which then implies given (19) and (20) that the enrollment shares for any
government-funded and non-participating private school with and without the voucher be equal;
however, their empirical counterparts in Table 1 reveal these values are in fact different. More
generally, the rejection arises from the fact that while the specification imposes that the demand
for a given school is not affected by prices of other schools, the data reveals this requirement is too
restrictive. In contrast, for the more flexible parametric specifications as well as the nonparametric
specification, the results in Columns (1) and (5)-(10) imply that they are not misspecified. In these
cases, as highlighted in Section 4, there exist multiple demand functions consistent with data and,
as a result, we can generally only obtain bounds for the parameters. Nonetheless, as we discuss
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Table 2: Average benefit, cost and surplus estimates for the status-quo voucher amount
Baseline Own-price Additively separable Nonseparable
K K K
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
AB (τsq)
599 ∅ ∅ ∅ 2,086 1,562 1,311 2,086 1,562 1,311
6,029 ∅ ∅ ∅ 2,252 2,779 3,050 2,324 2,903 3,210
AC (τsq)
207 ∅ ∅ ∅ 207 207 207 207 207 207
207 ∅ ∅ ∅ 207 207 207 207 207 207
AS (τsq)
392 ∅ ∅ ∅ 1,879 1,355 1,104 1,879 1,355 1,104
5,822 ∅ ∅ ∅ 2,045 2,572 2,843 2,117 2,696 3,004
Notes: For each estimate, the upper and lower value for each panel correspond to the lower and
upper bound, respectively. All amounts measured in US dollars.
SOURCE: Evaluation of the DC Opportunity Scholarship Program: Final Report (NCEE 2010-
4018), U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics previously unpub-
lished tabulations.
below, these bounds are quite tight and allow us to reach information conclusions.
The estimates for AB (τsq) under the nonparametric specification in Column (1) reveal that
the average benefit from the status-quo voucher is between $599 and $6, 029. Under auxiliary
parametric specifications, the bounds can substantially tighten. For example, under the most
informative specification in Column (5), the average benefit can be between $2,086 and $2,252,
whereas, under the most flexible specification in Column (10), it can be between $1,311 and $3,210.
The estimates for AC (τsq) reveal that the lower and upper bound are equal and, in turn, that it is
point identified across all specifications. In particular, point identification arises because AC (τsq)
is a function of demand at values of prices at which the demand is exactly observed in the data,
namely the prices with and without the status-quo voucher. The point identified value reveals
that the average net cost of providing the status-quo voucher is equal to $207. While this voucher
provides an amount of upto $7,500, the cost is relatively low due to the fact, as highlighted above,
that a large proportion of recipients redeem the voucher at low-cost private schools relative to the
government-funded schools they would have enrolled in absent the voucher.
Taking the difference of the average benefit and cost, the estimates for AS (τsq) reveal that the
average benefit net of costs of the status-quo voucher across all specification is generally positive.
In particular, under the nonparametric specification in Column (1), the bounds reveal that the
average surplus is between $392 and $5,822 and, under the most flexible parameteric specification
in Column (10), the bounds reveal that it is between $1,104 and $3,004. Intuitively, the positive
net benefit arises due to the relatively low net costs of providing the voucher that we highlighted
above. Specifically, the voucher recipients have a high welfare benefit from the low-price private
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schools at which they redeem the voucher relative to the low net costs the government faces to fund
the voucher at these schools, which then implies a positive net benefit.
In Appendix S.3.3, we perform several robustness checks on the above conclusion that the
provision of the status-quo voucher amount has a positive net average benefit. As we noted above,
our analysis chose a specific value of cg for the costs the government faces when a student enrolls
in a government-funded school. In addition, while the OSP allowed the voucher to be used to
offset additional fees and transportation costs, our analysis implicitly presumed that they could be
only used to offset tuition. Our robustness analysis measures the sensitivity of our average surplus
estimates to taking different values of cg as well as supposing that the voucher could be used to
offset an amount δ in addition to the tuition. We find that our conclusion continues to hold for a
range of values of cg and δ.
5.4 Welfare Estimates for Counterfactual Voucher Amounts
Figure 3 next presents the estimates of our various parameters measuring the welfare effects of
providing counterfactual voucher amounts. These parameters correspond to those illustrated in
Table 2 but for a range of values of τ = τc not necessarily equal to τsq as well as their differences
with the parameter when τ = τsq as described in (12)-(14). For conservativeness, we present
only results under the nonparametric and the most flexible parameteric specifications from Table
2, i.e. Columns (1) and (10), respectively. As in Table 2, the estimates are obtained using the
corresponding optimization problems with the empirical enrollment shares.
The estimates forAB (τc) and ∆AB (τc) reveal, unsurprisingly, that the average benefit increases
with the voucher amount. As in Table 2, the bounds under the parametric specification can
be considerably tighter than those under the nonparametric specification. Under the parametric
specification, we find that the bounds vary more for lower voucher amounts and are more stable
for larger amounts. The estimates for AC (τc) and ∆AC (τc) reveal, in contrast to the status-
quo amount in Table 2, that they are generally not point identified but only bounded. This is
because, unlike AC (τsq), these parameters are generally functions of demand at values of prices
not observed in the data. Unsurprisingly, the bounds under the nonparametric specification vary
non-smoothly and those under the parametric specification vary smoothly given that the latter
specification imposes a smooth relationship of how demand varies with prices while the former does
not. Similar to the average benefit, the average cost also varies more at lower voucher amounts.
For some voucher amounts, the estimates reveal that we can in fact have also a negative cost, i.e
government has cost-savings. This arises because at these values, as before, recipients continue
to redeem the voucher and switch to low-price schools from government-funded school, but now
the government actually saves as the costs of funding the voucher at these schools are significantly
lower than that of government-funded schools.
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Figure 3: Estimates for counterfactual voucher amounts
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SOURCE: Evaluation of the DC Opportunity Scholarship Program: Final Report (NCEE 2010-4018), U.S. Depart-
ment of Education, National Center for Education Statistics previously unpublished tabulations.
Taking the difference of average benefit and cost, the estimates for AS (τc) reveal that the
provision of counterfactual voucher amounts may have a positive average benefit net of costs.
Specifically, under the nonparametric specification, the bounds reveal that we have positive average
surplus for voucher amounts below the status-quo, but potentially not above it. This is because the
average costs are low relative to the benefit and potentially even negative at voucher amounts below
the stauts-quo, but drastically increase in a non-smooth manner above the status-quo. Under the
parameteric specification, the smooth relationship of demand with prices allows the pattern of costs
below the stauts-quo voucher to smoothly extend to voucher amounts about it as well implying a
positive average surplus for all voucher amounts. Comparing these values to the status-quo surplus,
the estimates for ∆AS (τc) under the parametric specification reveal that the bounds for voucher
amounts below around $1,500 are strictly negatively and, in turn, that providing these low voucher
amounts can be strictly worse off than the status-quo amount.
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5.5 Role of Low-tuition Schools in the Program
In summary, our welfare estimates under both the status-quo and counterfactual voucher amounts
reveal that voucher provision can have a positive net average benefit. While discussing these results,
we specifically noted that they arose due to the presence of low-tuition schools in the program that
induce a high welfare benefit for recipients relative to the net costs the government faces when the
voucher is redeemed at these schools. We conclude our analysis by investigating the importance of
these schools in the program when providing the status-quo voucher amount.
Specifically, we analyze how our estimates change when we remove schools having prices at
most a certain amount from the program. To this end, for a given κ ∈ R+, let J κ = {j ∈ Jv :
pj(0) ≤ κ} denote the set of private participating schools with prices at most an amount κ and let
jκ = arg maxJ κ denote the school with the highest price removed from the program. In addition,
let pκ(τ) = (p1(0), . . . , pjκ(0), pjκ+1(τ), . . . pJ(τ)) denote the prices of the schools in Jv under the
application of the status-quo amount when schools with prices at most κ are removed, i.e. the
status-quo voucher amount is applied to only schools with prices above κ. Then, similar to (8), the
average benefit of the status-quo voucher amount absent these schools can be defined by
ABκ (τsq) = E[B
κ(τsq)] . (36)
where Bκ(τsq) is given by the variable that solves
max
{
max
j∈Jg∪Jn
Uj(Yj), max
j∈J
Uj (Yj − pj(0))
}
=
max
{
max
j∈Jg∪Jn
Uj(Yj −Bκ(τsq)), max
j∈J
Uj
(
Yj − pκj (τsq)−Bκ(τsq)
)}
,
Similarly, the average cost and benefit net of costs can be defined by
ACκ (τsq) =
∑
j∈J
cκj (τsq) · qj(pκ(τsq))−
∑
j∈J
cj(0) · qj(p(0)) , (37)
ASκ (τsq) = AB
κ (τsq)−ACκ (τsq) . (38)
where cκj (τsq) = cj(τsq) for j ∈ J \ J
κ
and cκj (τsq) = 0 for j ∈ J κ, i.e. we take the same costs as
before except with the difference that we take the schools that are removed from the program to
have zero costs. In Appendix S.3.4, we describe how we can continue to use the programs in (32)
and (35) to learn about these parameters and, in turn, obtain estimates for these parameters using
their empirical counterparts as in Table 2 and Figure 3.
Figure 4 present the results for the above parameters for a range of values of κ and, as in Figure
3, for the nonparametric and most flexible parametric specifications from Table 2. The bounds
under the nonparametric specification are considerably wider than those under the parametric
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Figure 4: Estimates from removing schools with tuition at most κ from the program
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SOURCE: Evaluation of the DC Opportunity Scholarship Program: Final Report (NCEE 2010-4018), U.S. Depart-
ment of Education, National Center for Education Statistics previously unpublished tabulations.
specification and especially so for the average benefit, where the upper bound stays constant across
all values of κ. This is because the data does not provide any cross-price variation and, unlike the
parametric specification, the nonparametric specification does not impose any cross-price restric-
tions. Under the parametric specification, Figure 4(a)-(b) reveal that the average benefits and costs
first steeply decrease and increase, respectively, from the removal of low-tuition schools from the
program and then become more stable when more expensive schools are removed. This highlights
that recipients strongly value the presence of low-tuition schools in the program and absent these
schools are switching to the relatively more expensive government-funded schools.
Taking the difference of the average benefit and costs, Figure 4(c) reveals that the removal of low-
tuition schools from the program generally results in the reduction of average surplus. Specifically,
we find that absent schools with tuition at most $3,500 in the program we can potentially have a
negative surplus. A closer look at Figure 2(b) reveals that about 25% of schools in the program
are concentrated with tuition at most this value. The estimates from Figure 4(c) highlight that the
presence of these low-tuition schools in the program play an essential role in explaining the positive
net benefit our analysis finds for the provision of the status-quo voucher amount.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed the welfare effects of voucher provision in the DC Opportunity Scholar-
ship Program (OSP). We did so by developing new tools that showed how to generally use data with
random allocation of school vouchers to characterize what we can learn about the welfare effects of
providing a voucher of a given amount. Applying our tools to the OSP data, our estimates revealed
that provision of the status-quo as well as a wide range of counterfactual amounts has a positive net
average benefit and that these positive results arise due to the presence of may low-tuition schools
25
in the program.
To conclude, we note while the OSP provided vouchers valid for at least five years, our analysis
focused only on school choices collected in the initial year. As a result, unless recipients do not
change their choices across years, it is more appropriate to interpret our estimates in some sense as
the welfare effects of a voucher that is to be used in the same year. As noted in Wolf et al. (2010),
the data reveals there is in fact substantial variation in choices across years. It would be interesting
to estimate the welfare effects of the voucher across these years and analyze if the positive results
we find continue to hold. To do so, one would potentially need to considerably extend our analysis
to introduce and characterize related welfare parameters in some version of a dynamic discrete
choice model. We leave such extensions for future research.
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Abstract
This document presents proofs and additional details pertinent to the main analysis for the
authors’ paper titled “Estimating the Welfare Effects of School Vouchers.” Section S.1 presents
proofs of all results. Section S.2 presents additional details pertinent to the identification anal-
ysis. Section S.3 presents additional details pertinent to the empirical analysis.
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S.1 Proofs of Propositions
S.1.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
The proof of this proposition follows from Bhattacharya (2018, Proposition 1) and Bhattacharya
(2018, Theorem 1). We reproduce these proofs here in the context of our setup and notation for
completeness.
To see why the variable B(τ) exists and is unique, note first that the right hand side of (7) is
continuous in B(τ) as Uj is a continuous function for each j ∈ Js. In addition, since
Yj > Yj −B(τ) for j ∈ Jg ∪ Jn ,
Yj − pj(0) > Yj − pj(τ)−B(τ) for j ∈ Jv ,
for B(τ) > τ , and
Yj < Yj −B(τ) for j ∈ Jg ∪ Jn ,
Yj − pj(0) < Yj − pj(τ)−B(τ) for j ∈ Jv ,
for B(τ) < 0, note that it follows from the fact that Uj is strictly increasing for each j ∈ Js that
if B(τ) > τ then the right hand side of (7) is strictly smaller than its left hand side, whereas if
B(τ) < 0 then the right hand side will be strictly greater than the left hand side. Then, using
these two arguments together, it follows by the intermediate value theorem that there exists a
B(τ) ∈ [0, τ ] such that the right hand side equals the left hand side, i.e. a solution to (7) exists.
Furthermore, given that Uj is strictly increasing for each j ∈ Js, it also follows that the solution
to (7) must be unique.
To see why the average value of B(τ) is given by (9), note first from above that B(τ) ∈ [0, τ ]
and, in turn, that
Prob[B(τ) ≤ a] = 0 for a < 0 ,
Prob[B(τ) ≤ a] = 1 for a ≥ τ .
Next, to calculate this probability for a ∈ [0, τ), note that since Uj is strictly increasing for each
j ∈ Js, we have that B(τ) ≤ a is equivalent to
max
{
max
j∈Jg∪Jn
Uj(Yj) , max
j∈Jv
Uj (Yj − pj(0))
}
≥
max
{
max
j∈Jg∪Jn
Uj(Yj − a) , max
j∈Jv
Uj (Yj − pj(τ)− a)
}
.
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Then, it follows that for a ∈ [al(τ), al+1(τ)) for l = 0, . . . , j(τ), we have
Prob[B(τ) ≤ a] =
∑
j∈Jg∪Jn
Prob
Uj(Yj) ≥ max

max
i∈Jg∪Jn\{j}
Ui(Yi) , max
i∈Jv
Ui (Yi − pi(0)) ,
max
i∈Jg∪Jn
Ui(Yi − a) , max
i∈Jv
Ui (Yi − pi(τ)− a)


+
∑
j∈Jv
Prob

Uj(Yj − pj(0))
≥ max

max
i∈Jg∪Jn
Ui(Yi) , max
i∈Jv\{j}
Ui (Yi − pi(0)) ,
max
i∈Jg∪Jn
Ui(Yi − a) , max
i∈Jv
Ui (Yi − pi(τ)− a)


=
∑
j∈Jg∪Jn
Prob
Uj(Yj) ≥ max

max
i∈Jg∪Jn\{j}
Ui(Yi) , max
i∈Jv , i≤l
Ui (Yi − pi(0)) ,
max
i∈Jv ,i>l
Ui (Yi − pi(τ)− a)


+
l∑
j=1
Prob

Uj(Yj − pj(0))
≥ max

max
i∈Jg∪Jn
Ui(Yi) , max
1≤i≤l,i 6=j
Ui (Yi − pi(0)) ,
max
l<i≤J
Ui (Yi − pi(τ)− a)


=
∑
j∈{g,n},
1≤j≤l
qj (p1(0), . . . , pl(0), pl+1(τ) + a, . . . , pJ(τ) + a) ,
where the second equality from the fact that Uj is strictly increasing for each j ∈ Js along with
Yj−pj(τ)−a ≤ Yj−pj(0) for j ≤ l as pj(τ) = 0 and a ≥ aj(τ) = pj(0), and Yj−pj(τ)−a ≥ Yj−pj(0)
for j > l as pj(0) − pj(τ) = min{τ, pj(0)} ≥ al+1(τ) > a, and the final equality follows from the
definition of the average demand functions. Finally, given that for a positive random variable X
we have that its expectation is given by
E[X] =
∫ ∞
0
[1− Prob[X ≤ x]] dx ,
it follows from the above characterization of Prob[B(τ) ≤ a] along with noting that
J∑
j=l+1
qj(p1(0), . . ., pl(0), pl+1(t) + a, . . . , pJ(τ) + a)
= 1−
 ∑
j∈{g,n},
1≤j≤l
qj (p1(0), . . . , pl(0), pl+1(τ) + a, . . . , pJ(τ) + a)
 ,
that the average value of B(τ) is given by (9). This concludes the proof.
S.1.2 Proof of Proposition 4.1
In order to prove the proposition, we need to show that Θ ⊆ ΘB and ΘB ⊆ Θ, and that ΘB =
[θB, θ¯B] if B is non-empty. Below, we divide the proof into three parts respectively showing each
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of these statements. First, we show Θ ⊆ ΘB, i.e for every θ0 ∈ Θ there exists a β ∈ B such that
θB(β) = θ0. Second, we show ΘB ⊆ Θ, i.e. for every θ0 ∈ ΘB there exists a q ∈ Q such that
θ(q) = θ0. Third, we show that if B is non-empty then ΘB = [θB, θ¯B] .
Before proceeding, it is useful to first explicitly state the restrictions on β that characterize B as
well as the expression for the function θB. To this end, note that B corresponds to all β such that
the corresponding q determined by (28) satisfies the restrictions in (15)-(16), (3) and (17)-(20). In
turn, observe that (15) and (16) equivalently correspond to
0 ≤ βj(w) ≤ 1 for each j ∈ J , (S.1)∑
j∈J
βj(w) = 1 (S.2)
for each w ∈ W. To state the equivalent restriction corresponding to (3), we introduce additional
notation where w(j) = {t ∈ R : pj = t for some p ∈ w} for each w ∈ W and j ∈ Jv. Then, observe
that (3) equivalently corresponds to stating that for each w,w′ ∈ W such that t > t′ for all
t ∈ w(j), t′ ∈ w′(j) for j ∈ J ′ ⊆ Jv and w(j) = w′(j) for j ∈ Jv \ J ′, we have that
βj(w) ≥ βj(w′) (S.3)
for each j ∈ J \ J ′. Finally, observe that (17)-(20) equivalently corresponds to
βj ({p(0)}) = Pj|0 , (S.4)
βj ({p(τsq)}) = Pj|1 , (S.5)
for each j ∈ J . Then, it follows we can equivalently characterize B as
B =
{
β ∈ Rdβ : β satisfies (S.1)− (S.5)
}
, (S.6)
i.e. the set of all β that satisfy the above restrictions. The expression for θB depends on the choice
of parameter. As each of our parameters can be characterized by AB(τ) or AC(τ) by appropriately
choosing τ ∈ {τsq, τc} along with taking differences, we only derive the expression for θB when θ
corresponds to either AB(τ) or AC(τ) for some generic τ ∈ {τsq, τc}. In the case of AB(τ), observe
that θ and θB are given by
θ(q) ≡
j(τ)∑
l=0
J∑
j=l+1
al+1(τ)∫
al(τ)
qj(min{p(0), p(τ) + a}) da , (S.7)
=
j(τ)∑
l=0
J∑
j=l+1
∑
u∈U(l,τ)
a¯u∫
au
qj(min{p(0), p(τ) + a}) da , (S.8)
=
j(τ)∑
l=0
J∑
j=l+1
∑
u∈U(l,τ)
(a¯u − au) · βj(h(u)) ≡ θB(β) , (S.9)
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where min{p(0), p(τ) + a} ≡ (min{p1(0), p1(τ) + a}, . . . ,min{pJ(0), pJ(τ) + a}), U(l, τ) ≡ {u ∈ U :
u ⊆ Pl(τ)} and h(u) ∈ W for a given u ∈ U is such that h(u) =
J∏
j=1
u(j). In particular, the first
line simply recalls rewriting of AB(t) in terms of q from (9), the second line follows from rewriting
(9) in terms of the collection of sets U , and the third line then directly follows from substituting
the equation in (28). In the case of AC(τ), observe that θ and θB are given by
θ(q) ≡
∑
j∈J
cj(τ) · qj(p(τ))−
∑
j∈J
cj(0) · qj(p(0)) , (S.10)
=
∑
j∈J
cj(τ) · βj({p(τ)})−
∑
j∈J
cj(0) · βj({p(0)}) ≡ θB(β) , (S.11)
where the first line simply recalls the definition of AC(τ) from (10), and the second line follows
directly from substituting the equation in (28).
Given the explicit characterizations of B and θB, we now proceed to presenting the proofs of
each of the three parts.
Part 1: Since θ0 ∈ Θ, there exists by definition a q ∈ Q such that θ(q) = θ0. Using this q, we
construct a β such that β ∈ B and θB(β) = θ0. In particular, we take β to be such that
βj(w) =
1∫
0
qj (p(a,w)) da (S.12)
for each w ∈ W and j ∈ J , where, for each a ∈ (0, 1), p(a,w) = (p1(a,w), . . . , pJ(a,w)) with
pj(a,w) = w(j) + (w¯(j) − w(j)) · a for each j ∈ Jv such that w¯(j) = sup{t : t ∈ w(j)} and
w(j) = inf{t : t ∈ w(j)}.
We now show this constructed β is such that β ∈ B and θB(β) = θ0. First, we show that β ∈ B,
i.e. it satisfies the restrictions in (S.1)-(S.5). The restriction in (S.1) is satisfied for each w ∈ W
and j ∈ J as
0 ≤ βj(w) =
1∫
0
qj (p(a,w)) da ≤
1∫
0
1da ,
where the equality follows from (S.12) and the inequalities follow from (15). Similarly, the restriction
in (S.2) is satisfied for each w ∈ W and j ∈ J as
∑
j∈J
βj(w) =
1∫
0
∑
j∈J
qj (p(a,w)) da =
1∫
0
1da ,
where the first equality follows from (S.12) and the second equality from (16). Next, to see why
(S.3) is satisfied, take w,w′ ∈ W such that t > t′ for all t ∈ w(j), t′ ∈ w′(j) for j ∈ J ′ ⊆ Jv and
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w(j) = w′(j) for j ∈ Jv \ J ′. Observe, for each a ∈ (0, 1), it follows that pj(a,w) > pj(a,w) for
j ∈ J ′ ⊆ Jv and pj(a,w) = pj(a,w′) for j ∈ Jv \ J ′. In turn, it directly follows from (3) that
qj(a,w) ≥ qj(a,w′)
for each a ∈ (0, 1) for each j ∈ Jv \ J ′. Then, taking the integral over a ∈ (0, 1) and using (S.12),
it directly follows that (S.3) is satisfied. Finally, we show that the restrictions in (S.4) and (S.5)
are satisfied. To this end, observe that this is the case as
βj({p(0)}) = qj(p(0)) = Pj|0 ,
βj({p(τsq)}) = qj(p(τsq)) = Pj|1
for each j ∈ J , where in both lines the first equality follows from (S.12) and the second equality
follows from (17)-(20).
Next, we show that the constructed β is such that θB(β) = θ0. Since θ(q) = θ0, this is equivalent
to showing θB(β) = θ(q). As we noted above, each of our parameters can be written in terms of
AB(τ) or AC(τ) for an appropriate choice of τ ∈ {τsq, τc}. As a result, we only show θB(β) = θ(q)
when our parameter is equal to either AB(τ) or AC(τ) for a generic τ ∈ {τsq, τc}. In the case
of AB(τ), observe that the various components in θ(q) in (S.8) can be written in terms of the
constructed β as
a¯u∫
au
qj (min{p(0), p(τ) + a}) da = (a¯u − au)
1∫
0
qj (p(a, h(u))) da = βj(h(u))
for each u ∈ U(l, τ), 0 ≤ l ≤ j(τ) and l+1 ≤ j ≤ J , where the first equality follows from the change
of variables a = au + (a¯u − au) · a′ along with the above definition of p(a,w) with w = h(u), and
the second equality from (S.12). Similarly, in the case of AC(τ), observe the various components
of θ(q) in (S.10) can be written as
qj
(
p(τ ′)
)
=
1∫
0
qj
(
p
(
a, {p(τ ′)})) da = βj({p(τ ′)})
for each τ ′ ∈ {0, τ} and j ∈ J , where the first equality follows by construction given that
p (a, {p(τ ′)}) = p(τ ′) and the second equality from (S.12). Then, in both cases, substituting these
components rewritten in terms of β in the expressions for θ(q) in (S.8) and (S.10) results in the cor-
responding expression for θB(β) in (S.9) and (S.11), respectively, and, in turn, that θB(β) = θ(q).
This completes the first part of the proof.
Part 2: Since θ0 ∈ ΘB, there exist by definition a β ∈ B such that θB(β) = θ0 and, in turn,
by how ΘB and θB were constructed, a q ∈ QfdB that is related to β by the equation in (28) such
that θ(q) = θB(β) = θ0. Since it holds that Q
fd
B ⊆ QB, it follows that q ∈ Q. This completes the
second part of the proof.
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Part 3: Given the various linear restrictions that define B in (S.6), observe that B is a convex
and compact set. In addition, it is also a non-empty set by assumption. Then, since θB is a
continuous real-valued scalar function, it follows that the image of this function over B given by
ΘB is a convex, compact and non-empty set on the real line, i.e. a closed interval with endpoints
given by (31). This completes the final part of the proof.
S.1.3 Proof of Proposition 4.2
Note A is a connected and non-empty set. Then, since θA is a continuous real-valued scalar function,
it follows that the image of this function over A given by ΘA is a connected and non-empty set on
the real line, i.e. an interval whose closure has endpoints given by (35).
S.2 Additional Details on Identification Analysis
S.2.1 Point Identification of Demand Functions
In this section, we show the demand functions q can be point identified under the specification
in (5)-(6). To this end, observe, under this specification, the data restrictions in (17)-(20) can be
written as
αj0 + αj1 · pj (0) = Pj|0 , (S.13)
αj0 + αj1 · pj (τsq) = Pj|1 (S.14)
for each j ∈ Jv, and
αj0 = Pj|0 = Pj|1 (S.15)
for each j ∈ {g, n}. From (S.13)-(S.14), given there are two equation and two unknowns, it follows
that αj0 and αj1 are point identified for j ∈ Jv by the data provided pj (τsq) does not equal pj (0).
From (S.15), it directly follows that αj0 is point identified for j ∈ {g, n}. In turn, since α is point
identified, it follows that the q is point identified under this specification.
It is worth highlighting that the specification in (5)-(6) imposes restrictions conceptually similar
to a logit specification, a commonly used parameterization in discrete choice analysis, that also
achieves point identification in our setup. This logit specification is given by
log(qj(p))− log(qg(p)) = γj0 + γj1 · pj for j ∈ Jv , (S.16)
log(qn(p))− log(qg(p)) = γn , (S.17)
for some {γjk : j ∈ Jv, 0 ≤ k ≤ 1} and {γj0 : j ∈ {g, n}}, i.e. the difference in the log demands
for a given school in Jv and any school in Jg is a linear function of that school’s price and the
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difference in the log demands for any school in Jn and any school in Jg is constant. Often, the logit
specification is imposed by making assumptions on the underlying utilities. The one in (S.16)-(S.17)
can for example be implied by assuming that
Uj = γj0 + γj1 · pj + j for j ∈ Jv ,
max
j∈Jn
Uj = γn + n ,
max
j∈Jg
Uj = 0 ,
i.e. the utility of each school in Jv is linear function of its own price and additively separable
in the remaining underlying unobservables and the utility of the maximum government school
is normalized to zero, and by also assuming that the components of the remaining underlying
unobservables
(n, 1, . . . , J)
are independently and identically distributed according to the Type I extreme value distribution.
Importantly, comparing (5)-(6) to (S.16)-(S.17), observe that both specifications impose ar-
guably strong restrictions that do not allow each demand function in J to flexibly vary with prices
of other schools. Similar to how (5)-(6) does not allow qj for a given j ∈ J to not vary with prices pi
for i 6= j ∈ Jv, (S.16)-(S.17) also does not allow log(qj)− log(qg) to vary in such a manner. Indeed,
similar to how the data in our empirical analysis in Section 5 reveals that (5)-(6) is misspecified,
the data will also imply that this is the case with (S.16)-(S.17). To see why, observe while (S.17)
implies that the difference in log enrollment shares under any non-participating private school and
government-funded in the presence and absence of the receipt of the status-quo voucher is equal,
the data from Table 1 reveals that this is not the case.
S.2.2 Procedure to Compute U
In this section, we describe a procedure that can be used to obtain a collection of sets U that
partition P∗ in (26) as in Definition 4.1. Before proceeding, note, in the formal sense, a partition
ensures that each element of P∗ is only in one set of U . As a result, this requires carefully defining
the boundaries of the set u ∈ U satisfying Definition 4.1(i) to be either closed or open. However,
in a practical sense, this distinction is not required in our analysis as our parameters only take
Lebesgue integrals over these sets. To this end, in this section, we instead consider the following
alternative set of prices to that in (26):
P∗∗ =
j(τsq)⋃
l=0
P ′l (τsq)
j(τc)⋃
l=0
P ′l (τc)
⋃
{p(0), p (τsq) , p (τc)}
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where P ′l(τ) = {p ∈ P : pj = min{pj(0), pj(τ) + a} for a ∈ (al(τ), al+1(τ)) for each j ∈ Jv} for 0 ≤
l ≤ j(τ) for each τ ∈ {τsq, τc}, and describe a procedure to show how to obtain a collection of sets
U that partition this set as in Definition 4.1. We emphasize, however, by using more notation to
carefully adjust the endpoints of the intervals, this collection of sets we obtain will also correspond
to a partition of P∗.
In order to understand the main idea behind our procedure, observe first that
U(τsq) ∪ U(τc)
equals P∗∗, where
U(τ) =
{
P ′0(τ), . . . ,P ′j(τ)(τ), {p(0)}, {p(τ)}
}
,
For each τ ∈ {τsq, τc}, observe that U(τ) corresponds to a partition of the union of the sets in it
and that and also that each u ∈ U(t) satisfies Definition 4.1(i) or (ii) along with each u, u′ ∈ U(t)
satisfying (27). However, for a given u ∈ U(τsq) and u′ ∈ U(τc), it may possibly be that (27)
is not satisfied. In particular, it may be the case that u(j) 6= u′(j) for some j ∈ Jv, but that
u(j) ∩ u′(j) is a non-empty set equal to some interval with end points corresponding to those of
either u(j) or u′(j). For example, if u = P ′l(τsq) for some l ∈ {0, . . . , j(τsq)} and u′ = P ′l(τc) for
some l′ ∈ {0, . . . , j(τc)}, we can have for some j ∈ Jv that
u(j) ∩ u′(j) = (min {pj(0), pj(τc) + al′(τc)} ,min{pj(0), pj(τsq) + a(l+1)(τsq)})
or
u(j) ∩ u′(j) = (min {pj(0), pj(τsq) + al(τsq)} ,min{pj(0), pj(τc) + a(l′+1)(τc)})
depending on whether the lower (upper) end point of u′(j) is greater or lower than the lower (upper)
end point of u′(j), and, alternatively, if u′ = {p(τc)} instead, we can have for some j ∈ Jv that
u(j) ∩ u′(j) = {pj(τc)} .
Our procedure is based on the idea that in such cases we can further partition the elements of
U(τsq) and U(τc) to alternatively obtain U1(τsq) and U1(τc) such that, for each τ ∈ {τsq, τc}, we
continue to have that each u ∈ U1(τ) satisfies Definition 4.1(i) or (ii) and that each u, u′ ∈ U1(τ)
satisfies (27), but, in addition, we also have that each u ∈ U1(τsq) and u′ ∈ U1(τc) satisfy (27) for
a given j∗ ∈ Jv. For a given j∗ ∈ Jv and each τ ∈ {τsq, τc}, denoting by
A1(τ) = {a0(τ), . . . , aj(τ)+1(τ)} ,
the set of points used to define the sets in (24) and by
A2(τ) = A1(τ) ∪ {min{pj∗(0), a+ pj∗(τ ′)} − pj∗(τ) : a ∈ A1(τ ′)}
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the resulting set that includes all the points in A0(τ) in addition to those that play a role, when
we sum it with pj∗(τ), in defining the end points of the interval u(j
∗) for each u ∈ U(τ ′) for
τ ′ 6= τ ∈ {τsq, τc}, this alternative set can be given by
U1(τ) =
{
P ′′0 (τ), . . . ,P ′′L(τ)−1(τ), {p(0)}, {p(τ)}
}
(S.18)
where a(0)(τ) < . . . < aL(τ)(τ) denotes the ordered values of the set A2(τ) and
P ′′l (τ) =
{
p ∈ P : pj = min{pj(0), pj(τ) + a}, a ∈
(
a(l)(τ), a(l+1)(τ)
)
for each j ∈ Jv
}
for 0 ≤ l ≤ L(τ)−1. As before, observe that each u ∈ U1(τ) satisfies Definition 4.1(i) or (ii) and that
each u, u′ ∈ U1(τ) satisfies (27). To see why, in addition, for each u ∈ U1(τsq) and u′ ∈ U1(τc) we
have that (27) is satisfied for j∗ ∈ Jv, suppose that it wasn’t the case. In this case, we would then
instead have that u(j∗)∩u′(j∗) = [a, a¯] (or, alternatively, [a¯, a]), where a = min{pj∗(0), pj∗(τsq)+a}
for some a ∈ A2(τsq) and a¯ = min{pj∗(0), pj∗(τc) + a′} for some a′ ∈ A2(τc). However, observe
since, by construction, we have that a¯− pj∗(τsq) ∈ A2(τsq) and a− pj∗(τc) ∈ A2(τc), it follows that
there also exists a u˜ ∈ U1(τsq) and u˜′ ∈ U1(τc) such that u˜(j∗), u˜′(j∗) ⊆ [a, a¯]. As a result, since
it holds that u, u˜ ∈ U1(τsq) and u′, u˜′ ∈ U1(τc) both satisfy (27), it must in fact be the case that
u(j∗) = u′(j∗) = [a¯, a] or that u(j∗) ∩ u′(j∗) = ∅.
Our procedure is based on applying this same idea simultaneously to all j ∈ Jv with the aim
of ensuring that (27) is satisfied for all j ∈ Jv. However, unlike doing it for a given j∗, doing so
simultaneously may generate sets that do not necessarily satisfy (27) for all j ∈ Jv. As a result, our
procedure then continues to iterate through simultaneous applications of the idea until it generates
sets that satisfy (27) for all j ∈ Jv.
To summarize, we present the above described procedure in terms of the following step-wise
algorithm:
Step 1: For each τ ∈ {τsq, τc}, take A∗0(τ) = ∅ and
A∗1(τ) = {a0(τ), . . . , aj(τ)+1(τ)} ,
which corresponds to the set of points used to define the sets in (24).
...
Step l: If A∗l (τ) = A∗l−1(τ), then stop and take
U = U(τsq) ∪ U(τc) ,
where, for each τ ∈ {τsq, τc}, we have that
U(τ) =
{
P∗0 (τ), . . . ,P∗L∗(τ)−1(τ), {p(0)}, {p(τ)}
}
,
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P∗l (τ) =
{
p ∈ P : pj = min{pj(0), pj(τ) + a}, a ∈
(
a∗(l)(τ), a
∗
(l+1)(τ)
)
for each j ∈ Jv
}
0 ≤ l ≤ L∗(τ) − 1, and a∗(0)(τ) < . . . < a∗L(τ)(τ) denotes the ordered values of A∗l (τ).
Otherwise, i.e. if A∗l (τ) 6= A∗l−1(τ), then for each τ ∈ {τsq, τc} with τ ′ 6= τ ∈ {τsq, τc}, take
A∗l (τ) = A∗l−1(τ)
J⋃
j=1
{
min{pj(0), a+ pj(τ ′)} − pj(τ) : a ∈ A∗l−1(τ ′) \ A∗l−2(τ ′)
}
which correspond to the set of all points that simultaneously define the end points of the
intervals for all j ∈ Jv not included in the previous step.
...
S.2.3 Example of a Set Br
In this section, we describe an example a set Br such that φ(B) ⊆ Br that we use in our empirical
analysis when implementing the linear programs in (32).
To this end, it is first useful to consider an equivalent representation of the restrictions in (S.3)
written in terms of pairs w,w′ ∈ W. Specifically, consider the following restrictions∑
j∈J>
w′,w∪J †
βj(w) ≥
∑
j∈J>
w′,w∪J †
βj(w
′) (S.19)
for each J † ⊆ J =w,w′ and w,w′ ∈ W, where
J >w,w′ =
{
j ∈ Jv : t > t′ for all t ∈ w(j) , t′ ∈ w′(j)
}
,
J =w,w′ = J \
(
J >w,w′ ∪ J >w′,w
)
.
and, as before, w(j) = {t ∈ R : pj = t for some p ∈ w} for each w ∈ W and j ∈ Jv. To see why
these restrictions imply those in (S.3), consider w,w′ ∈ W such that t > t′ for all t ∈ w(j), t′ ∈ w′(j)
for j ∈ J ′ ⊆ Jv and w(j) = w′(j) for j ∈ Jv \ J ′. In this case, note that J >w,w′ = J ′, J >w′,w = ∅,
and J =w,w′ = J \ J ′. Then, taking J † = J =w,w′ \ {j} for each j ∈ J =w,w′ in (S.19) implies that
(S.3) holds for each j ∈ J ′. To see why the restrictions in (S.3) imply those in (S.19), consider
w,w′ ∈ W as well as a w′′ ∈ W such that we have w′′(j) = w′(j) = w(j) for j ∈ J =w,w′ , w′′(j) = w(j)
for j ∈ J >w,w′ , and w′′(j) = w′(j) for j ∈ J >w′,w. Since this implies that t′′ > t for all t ∈ w(j),
t′′ ∈ w′′(j) for j ∈ J >w′,w and w(j) = w′′(j) for j ∈ J =w,w′ ∪ J >w,w′ , it follows from (S.3) that
βj(w
′′) ≥ βj(w) (S.20)
for each j ∈ J =w,w′ ∪ J >w,w′ . Similarly, since it also implies that t′′ > t′ for all t ∈ w′(j), t′′ ∈ w′′(j)
for j ∈ J >w,w′ and w′(j) = w′′(j) for j ∈ J =w,w′ ∪ J >w′,w, it also follows from (S.3) that
βj(w
′′) ≥ βj(w′) (S.21)
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for each j ∈ J =w,w′ ∪ J >w′,w. Then, for each J † ⊆ J =w,w′ , this implies that (S.19) holds as∑
j∈J>
w′,w∪J †
βj(w
′) ≤
∑
j∈J>
w′,w∪J †
βj(w
′′) ≤ 1−
∑
j∈J\
(
J>
w′,w∪J †
)βj(w′′)
≤ 1−
∑
j∈J\
(
J>
w′,w∪J †
)βj(w) ≤
∑
j∈J>
w′,w∪J †
βj(w)
where the first inequality follows from (S.21), the second inequality follows from (S.2), the third
inequality from (S.20), and the final inequality from (S.2).
Given the equivalence between the restrictions in (S.3) and (S.19), we can alternatively write
B in (S.6) as
B =
{
β ∈ Rdβ : β satisfies (S.1)− (S.2), (S.19), and (S.4)− (S.5)
}
.
In this set, observe that each restriction on β is for a given w ∈ W or for a pair of w,w′ ∈ W.
Our choice of Br corresponds to the subset of these restrictions on β for w ∈ Wr or for pairs of
w,w′ ∈ Wr, i.e. the subset of restrictions that directly correspond those that are in terms of βr.
More specifically, these restrictions correspond to the following
0 ≤ βrj(w) ≤ 1 for each j ∈ J and w ∈ Wr , (S.22)∑
j∈J
βrj(w) = 1 for each w ∈ Wr , (S.23)∑
j∈J>
w′,w∪J †
βrj(w) ≥
∑
j∈J>
w′,w∪J †
βrj(w
′) for each J † ⊆ J =w,w′ and w,w′ ∈ Wr , (S.24)
βrj({p(0)}) = Pj|0 for each j ∈ J , (S.25)
βrj({p(τsq)}) = Pj|1 for each j ∈ J . (S.26)
Then, denoting by dβr the dimension of β
r, the set we consider is given by
Br =
{
βr ∈ Rdβr : βr satisfies (S.22)− (S.26)
}
.
S.2.4 Implementation using Bernstein Polynomial
In this section, we describe how to implement each of the parametric specifications in Assumption
O, Assumption AS and Assumption NS through Proposition 4.2 using the Bernstein polynomial
basis. Specifically, the kth Bernstein basis polynomial of degree K is defined by
bKk (t) =
(
K
k
)
tk(1− t)K−k .
for 0 ≤ k ≤ K and t ∈ [0, 1]. Below, normalizing the support of prices [0, pj(0)] for each j ∈ Jv to
take values in [0, 1], we first state how each of the parametric specifications can be represented in
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terms of the Bernstein basis. Then, using properties of this representation, we show how to explicitly
characterize the constraint set A under these specifications for the optimization problems in (35).
In addition, we also show how to use the properties of the representation to explicitly characterize
the function θA corresponding to the objective of these optimization problems. Since, as noted in
Appendix S.1.2, each of our parameters can be characterized by AB(τ) or AC(τ) by appropriately
choosing τ ∈ {τsq, τc} along with taking differences, we only derive the expression for θA when θ
corresponds to either AB(τ) or AC(τ) for some generic τ ∈ {τsq, τc}.
As we will observe, under this representation using the Bernstein basis, the constraint sets
correspond to a set of linear equality and inequality constraints whereas the objectives correspond
to linear functions. Together, as noted in Section 4.3, this implies that the optimization problems
in (35) can be implemented using linear programs—see Chen et al. (2011), Compiani (2019) and
Mogstad et al. (2018) for examples of some alternative settings in economics where Bernstein
polynomials have similarly been used for their resulting computational attractiveness.
S.2.4.1 Under Assumption O
Under Assumption O, observe that the specification corresponds to
qj(p) =
fj(pj) if j ∈ Jv ,αj if j ∈ {g, n} ,
where, for each j ∈ Jv, fj is any polynomial of degree K. In turn, by noting that we can rewrite
fj in Bernstein polynomial form by
fj(pj) =
K∑
k=0
fj
(
k
K
)
bKk (pj) ,
for each j ∈ Jv, it follows that we can write this specification equivalently in terms of the Bernstein
polynomial basis by
qj(p) =

K∑
k=0
αjkb
K
k (pj) if j ∈ Jv ,
αj if j ∈ {g, n} ,
(S.27)
for some α ∈ Rdα which captures the set {αg, αn} ∪ {αjk : j ∈ Jv, 0 ≤ k ≤ K} in vector notation
where dα denotes the cardinality of this set, and α is related to q by
αjkj = qj
(
k1
K
, . . . ,
kJ
K
)
for j ∈ Jv ,
αj = qj
(
k1
K
, . . . ,
kJ
K
)
for j ∈ {g, n} ,
for all 0 ≤ k1, . . . , kJ ≤ K.
12
Given the relationship between α and q, we can now characterize A by translating the restric-
tions in (15)-(20) in terms of α. The restrictions in (15) and (16) can equivalently be rewritten
as
αjkj ≥ 0 for all j ∈ Jv , (S.28)
αj ≥ 0 for all j ∈ {g, n} , (S.29)
J∑
j=1
αjkj +
∑
j∈{g,n}
αj = 1 (S.30)
for all 0 ≤ k1, . . . , kJ ≤ K. The shape restrictions in (3) do not impose any additional restrictions.
Finally, the data restrictions in (17) - (20) can equivalently be rewritten as
K∑
k=0
αjkb
K
k (pj(0)) = Pj|0 , (S.31)
K∑
k=0
αjkb
K
k (pj(τsq)) = Pj|1 (S.32)
for j ∈ Jv, and
αj = Pj|0 , (S.33)
αj = Pj|1 (S.34)
for j ∈ {g, n}. Then, it follows that we can equivalently characterize A by
A =
{
α ∈ Rdα : α satisfies (S.28)− (S.34)
}
.
For the purposes of implementation, it is useful to highlight that some of the above restrictions
are redundant in the sense that they are implied by the other remaining restrictions. As a result,
we can remove these restrictions without altering the constraint set, which can potentially make
the optimization problem more easier to compute. To this end, note that (S.30) can be equivalently
rewritten as
J∑
j=1
αj0 +
∑
j∈{g,n}
αj = 1 , (S.35)
J∑
j=1
αjkj +
∑
j∈{g,n}
αj −
J∑
j=1
αjk′j +
∑
j∈{g,n}
αj = 0 (S.36)
for all 0 ≤ k1, . . . , kJ ≤ K and 0 ≤ k′1, . . . , k′J ≤ K. Then, by noting that the restrictions in (S.36)
can be rewritten as
J∑
j=1
αjkj +
∑
j∈{g,n}
αj −
J∑
j=1
αjk′j +
∑
j∈{g,n}
αj =
J∑
j=1
max{kj ,k′j}∑
k=min{kj ,k′j}
(αj(k+1) − αjk) = 0
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for all 0 ≤ k1, . . . , kJ ≤ K and 0 ≤ k′1, . . . , k′J ≤ K, it follows that these restrictions can be implied
by the follow subset of restrictions
αj(k+1) − αjk = 0 (S.37)
for all j ∈ Jv and 0 ≤ k ≤ K− 1. Removing the various redundant restriction, we can then rewrite
the constraint set with the fewer number of restrictions as follows
A =
{
α ∈ Rdα : α satisfies (S.28)− (S.29), (S.31)− (S.34), (S.35) and (S.37)
}
.
Next, we derive explicit expressions for θA when θ corresponds to either AB(τ) or AC(τ) for
some generic value τ ∈ {τsq, τc} under this specification. In the case of AB(τ), observe first that
by directly substituting (S.27) in (9) we have
θA(α) ≡
j(τ)∑
l=0
J∑
j=l+1
K∑
k=0
αjk
al+1(τ)∫
al(t)
bKk (pj(τ) + a) da (S.38)
Moreover, by noting that we can write the Bernstein basis in terms of the power basis by
bKk (t) =
K∑
i=k
(−1)i−K
(
K
i
)(
i
k
)
ti
for each 0 ≤ k ≤ K and t ∈ [0, 1], observe that the integral in this expression can be also be
explicitly characterized by
a¯∫
a
bKk (x+ a) da =
K∑
i=k
(−1)i−K
(
K
i
)(
i
k
)(
(a¯+ a)i+1 − (a+ a)i+1
i+ 1
)
. (S.39)
by appropriatly choosing values of a¯, a, k and x. In the case of AC(t), observe that by directly
substituting (S.27) in (10) we have
θA ≡
∑
j∈Jv
K∑
k=0
[cj(τ)b
K
k (pj(τ))− cj(0)bKk (pj(0))] · αjk +
∑
j∈{g,n}
[cj(τ)− cj(0)] · αj . (S.40)
S.2.4.2 Under Assumption AS
Under Assumption AS, observe that the specification equivalently corresponds to
qj(p) =
J∑
i=1
fji(pi)
for each j ∈ J , where fji is any polynomial of degree K. In turn, by noting that we can rewrite
fji in Bernstein polynomial form by
fji(pi) =
K∑
k=0
fji
(
k
K
)
bKk (pi)
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for each j ∈ J and i ∈ Jv, it follows that we can write this specification in terms of the Bernstein
polynomial basis by
qj(p) =
J∑
i=1
K∑
k=0
αjikbk(pi) (S.41)
for some α ∈ Rdα which captures the set {αjik : j ∈ J , i ∈ Jv, 0 ≤ k ≤ K} in vector notation
where dα denotes the cardinality of this set, and α is related to q by
J∑
i=1
αjiki = qj
(
k1
K
, . . . ,
kJ
K
)
for all j ∈ J and 0 ≤ k1, . . . , kJ ≤ J .
Given the relationship between α and q, we can now characterize A by translating the restric-
tions in (15)-(20) in terms of α. The restrictions in (15) and (16) can equivalently be rewritten
as
J∑
i=1
αjiki ≥ 0 for all j ∈ J (S.42)
∑
j∈J
J∑
i=1
αjiki = 1 (S.43)
for all 0 ≤ k1, . . . , kJ ≤ J . The shape restrictions in (3) can be equivalently rewritten as
αjiK ≥ . . . ≥ αji0 (S.44)
for each j ∈ J and i 6= j ∈ Jv. Finally, the data restrictions in (17) - (20) can equivalently be
rewritten as
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=0
αjikb
K
k (pj(0)) = Pj|0 (S.45)
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=0
αjikb
K
k (pj(τsq)) = Pj|1 (S.46)
for each j ∈ J . Then, it follows that we can equivalently characterize A by
A =
{
α ∈ Rdα : α satisfies (S.42)− (S.46)
}
As before, there are some redundant restrictions, which we can remove without altering the
constraint set to make the optimization problems more easier to compute. To this end, observe
that since we have that the restrictions in (S.44) imply
J∑
i=1
αjiki ≥ αjjkj +
J∑
i=1
i 6=j
αji0 for all j ∈ Jv
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J∑
i=1
αjiki ≥
J∑
i=1
αji0 for all j ∈ {g, n}
for all 0 ≤ k1, . . . , kJ ≤ K, it directly follows that the restrictions (S.42) are implied by the following
subset of restrictions
αjjk +
J∑
i=1
i 6=j
αji0 ≥ 0 for all j ∈ Jv and 0 ≤ k ≤ K , (S.47)
J∑
i=1
αji0 ≥ 0 for all j ∈ {g, n} . (S.48)
In a similar manner, the restrictions in (S.43) can be implied by only a subset of them. To state
these restrictions, note first that (S.43) can be equivalently rewritten as
∑
j∈J
J∑
i=1
αji0 = 1 , (S.49)
∑
j∈J
J∑
i=1
αjik′i −
∑
j∈J
J∑
i=1
αjiki = 0 (S.50)
for all 0 ≤ k1, . . . , kJ ≤ K and 0 ≤ k′1, . . . , k′J ≤ K. Then, by noting that
∑
j∈J
J∑
i=1
αjik′i −
∑
j∈J
J∑
i=1
αjiki =
∑
j∈J
J∑
i=1
max{ki,k′i}−1∑
k=min{ki,k′i}
(αji(k+1) − αjik)
for each 0 ≤ k1, . . . , kJ ≤ K and 0 ≤ k′1, . . . , k′J ≤ K, it follows that the restrictions in (S.50) can
implied the following subset of restrictions∑
j∈J
(αji(k+1) − αjik) = 0 (S.51)
for all i ∈ Jv and 0 ≤ k ≤ K − 1. Removing the various redundant restrictions described above,
we can then rewrite the constraint set with these fewer number of restrictions as follows
A =
{
α ∈ Rdα : α satisfies (S.47)− (S.49), (S.51) and (S.44)− (S.46)
}
.
Next, we derive explicit expressions for θA when θ corresponds to either AB(τ) or AC(τ) for
some generic value τ ∈ {τsq, τc} under this specification. In the case of AB(τ), observe by directly
substituting (S.41) in (9) we have
θA(α) ≡
j(t)∑
l=0
J∑
j=l+1
K∑
k=0
 l∑
i=1
αjikb
K
k (pi(0))(al+1(τ)− al(τ))
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+J∑
i=l+1
αjik
al+1(τ)∫
al(τ)
bKk (pi(τ) + a) da
 . (S.52)
Moreover, observe that (S.39) also provide an explicit characterization of the integral. In the case
of AC(τ), observe that it directly follows by substituting (S.41) in (10) that we have
θA(α) ≡
∑
j∈J
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=0
[cj(τ)b
K
k (pj(τ))− cj(0)bKk (pj(0))] · αjik . (S.53)
S.2.4.3 Under Assumption NS
Under Assumption NS, observe that the specification equivalently corresponds to
qj(p) =

J∑
i=1
i 6=j
fji(pj , pi) if j ∈ Jv ,
J∑
i=1
fji(pi) if j ∈ {g, n} ,
where, for each j ∈ Jv, where fij is any bivariate polynomial of degree K, and, for j ∈ {g, n}, fji
is any polynomial of degree K. Then, by noting that we can rewrite fji in Bernstein polynomial
form by
fji(pj , pi) =
K∑
ki,kj=0
fji
(
kj
K
,
ki
K
)
bKk (pj)b
K
k (pj) ,
for j ∈ Jv, and by
fji(pi) =
K∑
k=0
fji
(
k
K
)
bKk (pj)
for j ∈ {g, n}, it follows that
qj(p) =

J∑
i=1
i 6=j
K∑
ki,kj=0
αjikjkib
K
kj
(pj)b
K
ki
(pi) if j ∈ Jv
J∑
i=1
K∑
k=0
αjikb
K
k (pi) if j ∈ {g, n} ,
(S.54)
for some α ∈ Rdα which captures the set {αjik : j ∈ {g, n}, i ∈ Jv, 0 ≤ k ≤ K} ∪ {αjikl : j, i ∈
Jv, 0 ≤ k, l ≤ K} in vector notation where dα denotes the cardinality of this set, and α is related
to q by
J∑
i=1
i 6=j
αjikjki = qj
(
k1
K
, . . . ,
kJ
K
)
for j ∈ Jv ,
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J∑
i=1
αjiki = qj
(
k1
K
, . . . ,
kJ
K
)
for j ∈ {g, n} ,
for all 0 ≤ k1, . . . , kj ≤ J .
Given the relationship between variable α and q, we can now characterize A by translating
the restrictions in (15)-(20) in terms of α. The restrictions in (15) and (16) can equivalently be
rewritten as
J∑
i=1
i 6=j
αjikjki ≥ 0 for j ∈ Jv , (S.55)
J∑
i=1
αjiki ≥ 0 for j ∈ {g, n} , (S.56)
J∑
j=1
J∑
i=1
i 6=j
αjikjki +
∑
j∈{g,n}
J∑
i=1
αjiki = 1 (S.57)
for all 0 ≤ k1, . . . , kJ ≤ K. The shape restrictions in (3) can be equivalently rewritten as
αjikK ≥ . . . ≥ αjik0 for j ∈ Jv, i ∈ Jv \ {j} and 0 ≤ k ≤ K, (S.58)
αjiK ≥ . . . ≥ αji0 for j ∈ {g, n} and i ∈ Jv . (S.59)
Finally, the data restrictions in (17) - (20) can equivalently be rewritten as
J∑
i=1
i 6=j
K∑
ki,kj=0
αjikjkib
K
kj
(pj(0))b
K
ki
(pi(0)) = Pj|0 , (S.60)
J∑
i=1
i 6=j
K∑
ki,kj=0
αjikjkib
K
kj
(pj(τsq))b
K
ki
(pi(τsq)) = Pj|1 (S.61)
for j ∈ Jv, and
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=0
αjikb
K
k (pj(0)) = Pj|0 (S.62)
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=0
αjikb
K
k (pj(τsq)) = Pj|1 (S.63)
for each j ∈ {g, n}. Then, it follows that we can equivalently characterize A by
A =
{
α ∈ Rdα : α satisfies (S.55)− (S.63)
}
As before, there are some redundant restrictions, which we can remove without altering the
constraint set to make the optimization problems more easier to compute. Since it follows from
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(S.58) and (S.59) that
J∑
i=1
i 6=j
αjikjki ≥
J∑
i=1
i 6=j
αjikj0 for j ∈ Jv ,
J∑
i=1
αjiki ≥
J∑
i=1
αji0 for j ∈ {g, n} ,
it directly follows that the restrictions in (S.55) and (S.56) are implied by the following subset of
restrictions
J∑
i=1
i 6=j
αjikj0 ≥ 0 for all j ∈ Jv and 0 ≤ kj ≤ K , (S.64)
J∑
i=1
αji0 ≥ 0 for all j ∈ {g, n} , (S.65)
In a similar manner, the restrictions in (S.43) can be implied by only a subset of them. To see
these restrictions, observe first that the restrictions in (S.43) can equivalently be rewritten as
J∑
j=1
J∑
i=1
i 6=j
αji00 +
∑
j∈{g,n}
J∑
i=1
αji0 = 1 (S.66)
and
J∑
j=1
J∑
i=1
i 6=j
αjik′jk′i +
∑
j∈{g,n}
J∑
i=1
αjik′i =
J∑
j=1
J∑
i=1
i 6=j
αjikjki −
∑
j∈{g,n}
J∑
i=1
αjiki (S.67)
for all 0 ≤ k1, . . . , kJ ≤ K and 0 ≤ k′1, . . . , k′J ≤ K such that k′j∗ = kj∗ + 1 for some given j∗ ∈ Jv
and k′j = kj for the remaining j ∈ Jv \{j∗}. Then, by taking the difference of the left and the right
hand sides of (S.67) and simply removing the common terms, note that (S.67) can be simplified
and in turn implied by the following subset of restrictions
J∑
i=1
i 6=j∗
(
αji(k+1)ki − αjikki + αijki(k+1) − αijkik
)
+
∑
i∈{g,n}
(
αij(k+1) − αijk
)
= 0
for each j∗ ∈ Jv, 0 ≤ k ≤ K − 1 and 0 ≤ kj ≤ K for j ∈ Jv \ {j∗}. These restrictions can be
further implied a subset of restrictions. To see these restrictions, as before, observe first that the
restrictions in (S.67) can be equivalently be rewritten as
J∑
i=1
i 6=j∗
(
αji(k+1)0 − αjik0 + αij0(k+1) − αij0k
)
+
∑
i∈{g,n}
(
αij(k+1) − αijk
)
= 0 (S.68)
19
for each j∗ ∈ Jv and 0 ≤ k ≤ K − 1, and
J∑
i=1
i 6=j∗
(
αji(k+1)k′i − αjikk′i + αijk′i(k+1) − αijk′ik
)
+
∑
i∈{g,n}
(
αij(k+1) − αijk
)
(S.69)
=
J∑
i=1
i 6=j∗
(
αji(k+1)ki − αjikki + αijki(k+1) − αijkik
)
+
∑
i∈{g,n}
(
αij(k+1) − αijk
)
for each j∗ ∈ J , 0 ≤ k ≤ K − 1, and 0 ≤ kj , k′j ≤ K for j ∈ Jv \ {j∗} such that k′i = ki + 1 for
i = i∗ for some given i∗ ∈ Jv \ {j∗} and k′i = ki for the remaining i ∈ Jv \ {j∗, i∗}. Then, by simply
removing the common terms from the right and left hand side of (S.69), note that the restrictions
in (S.69) can be simplified and in turn implied by the following subset of restrictions
αji(k+1)(l+1) − αjik(l+1) + αij(l+1)(k+1) − αij(l+1)k (S.70)
= αji(k+1)l − αjikl + αijl(k+1) − αijlk
for each j, i ∈ Jv such that i 6= j and all 0 ≤ k, l ≤ K − 1. Removing the various redundant
restrictions described above, we can then rewrite the constraint set with these fewer number of
restrictions as follows
A =
{
α ∈ Rdα : α satisfies (S.64)− (S.66), (S.68), (S.70) and (S.58)− (S.63)
}
.
Next, we derive explicit expressions for θA when θ corresponds to either AB(τ) or AC(τ) for
some generic value τ ∈ {τsq, τc} under this specification. In the case of AB(τ), observe first that
by directly substituting (S.54) in (9) we have
θA(α) ≡
j(t)∑
l=0
J∑
j=l+1
K∑
kj ,ki=0
 l∑
i=1
αjikjki · bKki(pi(0)) ·
 al+1(τ)∫
al(t)
bKkj (pj(τ) + a) da

+
J∑
i=l+1
i 6=j
αjikjki ·
 al+1(τ)∫
al(τ)
bKkj (pj(τ) + a) · bKki(pi(τ) + a) da

 (S.71)
Moreover, observe that the first integral in the above expression can be explicitly characterized by
(S.39). Further, by similarly using the binomial theorem, observe that the second integral in the
above expression can also be explicitly characterized by
a¯∫
a
bKk1(t1 + a)b
K
k2(t2 + a) da =
K∑
l1=k1
l2=k1
(−1)l1+l2−k1−k2(K
l1
)(
l1
k1
)(
K
l2
)(
l2
k2
)
·
l1∑
m1=0
l2∑
m2=0
(
l1
m1
)(
l2
m2
)
tl1−m11 t
l2−m2
2
a¯∫
a
al1+l2 da
 (S.72)
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for each 0, k1, k2 ≤ K and t ∈ [0, 1]. In the case of AC(τ), observe that by directly substituting
(S.54) in (10) we have
θA(α) ≡
J∑
j=1
J∑
i=1
i 6=j
K∑
kj ,ki=0
αjikjki ·
[
bKkj (pj(τ))b
K
ki
(pi(τ))cj(τ)− bKkj (pj(0))bKki(pi(0))cj(0)
]
+
∑
j∈{g,n}
J∑
i=1
K∑
k=0
αjik ·
[
bKk (pi(τ))cj(τ)− bKk (pi(0))cj(0)
]
. (S.73)
S.3 Additional Details on Empirical Analysis
S.3.1 Data Construction
In this section, we describe how we construct the data used in our empirical analysis in Section
5. The original data sample comes from the replication files for the evaluation of OSP, which are
available from the US Department of Education (Wolf et al., 2010). Recall our analysis focuses
on the initial school choice for students who entered the experiment in 2005. Beginning with this
subsample, we make the following data-cleaning choices to reach our final analysis data.
Our analysis requires only the school choices of the students (to compute their enrollment shares)
and the prices (as measured by the tuition) of the participating private schools. In our data, while
the tuition value is available for all participating private schools, the school choices were missing
for 36% of the students. By a fortunate quirk of the research design, however, participating private
schools reported all voucher students to the researchers. Unobserved school choices must therefore
be either in non-participating private schools, or government-funded schools. Given that 98%
percent of surveyed students not in participating private schools are in fact in government-funded
schools, we assume that all these students are in government-funded schools. Once we obtain
these school choices, we weight these observed choices using the baseline weights of the original
evaluation—see Wolf et al. (2010, Appendix A.7) for details on how these weights were constructed.
S.3.2 Summary Statistics on School Setting
In this section, we describe some additional statistics on the sample of students and schools present
in our analysis data that we did not present in Section 5.2.
Table S.1 reports mean characteristics of students and their families. Only families making
less than 185% of the federal poverty line were eligible for the program, and so unsurprisingly
the students are relatively disadvantaged. Approximately 50% of the children’s mothers were
married, and fewer than 50% were employed at baseline. Family income was slightly less than
$17,000. Baseline achievement reflects both positive and negative selection: families selected into
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Table S.1: Mean student and family characteristics by voucher receipt, baseline weights
With Voucher Without voucher Difference
Mother married (=1) 0.52 0.55 -0.034
Mother years education 12.20 12.25 -0.057
Mother works full time (=1) 0.35 0.38 -0.028
Mother works part time (=1) 0.11 0.11 0.007
Family income ($) 16725.07 17372.20 -647.128
HH receives govt transfers (=1) 0.03 0.01 0.016
Household size 4.11 4.14 -0.030
Black (=1) 1.00 1.00 -0.001
Male (=1) 0.50 0.47 0.030
Grade ≤ 5 (=1) 0.65 0.65 0.000
Grade 6-8 (=1) 0.21 0.21 -0.000
Grade ≥ 9 (=1) 0.14 0.14 0.000
Child learning disabilities (=1) 0.09 0.09 -0.004
Observations 1,090 730
Notes: Observations rounded to the nearest 10.
SOURCE: Evaluation of the DC Opportunity Scholarship Program: Final Report (NCEE 2010-4018),
U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics previously unpublished tabu-
lations.
participation in the experiment, but they also had to be relatively poor to qualify. The table also
reveals that voucher recipients and non-recipients are relatively balanced in terms of the various
predetermined characteristics. This suggests that the receipt of the voucher was random in line
with Assumption B(i).
Table S.2 reports characteristics of the private and government-funded schools in the sample,
both unweighted and weighted by attendance. Panel A reveals that the private schools are substan-
tially whiter, have smaller student/teacher ratios, and are more likely to track students by ability.
Most strikingly, many of the private schools are religious—35% of them are Catholic, and an ad-
ditional 20% another religion. In addition, private schools tend to have lower share of minorities,
lower share of student/teacher ratio, lower school sizes, have more students tracked by ability and
have lower learning difficulties program. Comparing Panel A and Panel B reveals that some of the
general differences present between private and government-funded schools are however not present
between the subsets of these schools actually attended.
S.3.3 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we perform two sensitivity analyses to analyze the robustness of our empirical
results in Section 5.3 that revealed that the provision of the status-quo voucher amount results in
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Table S.2: Mean characteristics of sample schools
Private Government-funded Difference
Panel A: Unweighted characteristics
Share minority 0.73 0.96 -0.227
School size 222.97 325.90 -102.924
Student/teacher ratio 8.92 12.82 -3.897
Catholic (=1) 0.35 0.00 0.354
Other religious (=1) 0.20 0.00 0.200
Secular (=1) 0.45 1.00 -0.554
Gifted program (=1) 0.35 0.39 -0.040
Learning difficulties program (=1) 0.48 0.93 -0.447
Individual tutors available (=1) 0.64 0.69 -0.052
Students tracked by ability (=1) 0.79 0.60 0.192
Remedial classes available (=1) 0.61 0.68 -0.070
Panel B: Attendance-weighted characteristics
Share minority 0.96 0.98 -0.017
School size 205.86 419.46 -213.605
Student/teacher ratio 13.17 13.72 -0.551
Catholic (=1) 0.53 0.00 0.534
Other religious (=1) 0.25 0.00 0.252
Secular (=1) 0.21 1.00 -0.786
Gifted program (=1) 0.34 0.34 -0.000
Learning difficulties program (=1) 0.45 0.96 -0.518
Individual tutors available (=1) 0.80 0.77 0.026
Students tracked by ability (=1) 0.70 0.55 0.157
Remedial classes available (=1) 0.68 0.73 -0.048
Observations 60 160
Notes: We do not break out the private schools by participation status because the non-participating
schools almost never responded. Observations rounded to the nearest 10.
SOURCE: Evaluation of the DC Opportunity Scholarship Program: Final Report (NCEE 2010-
4018), U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics previously unpub-
lished tabulations.
a positive net average benefit.
First, recall our analyses use a pre-specified value for cg, the cost the government faces when a
student enrolls in a government-funded schools. Figure S.1(a) presents estimates for the parameter
AS(τsq), estimated in the same way as in Table 2, for a range of values of cg. For conservativeness,
we focus on the two most flexible specifications in Table 2, i.e. the nonparametric specification in
Column (1) and the most flexible auxiliary parametric specification in Column (10). Figure S.1(a)
reveals the average surplus increases when larger values of chosen for cg. The arises simply due to
the fact that the voucher induces recipients away from government-funded schools, which implies
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Figure S.1: Estimates of sensitivity analysis for average surplus under status-quo voucher amount
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SOURCE: Evaluation of the DC Opportunity Scholarship Program: Final Report (NCEE 2010-4018), U.S.
Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics previously unpublished tabulations.
that a higher cg results in higher net cost savings and hence a higher average surplus. Observe that
as long as we assume that cg is at least slightly above $3,500, the conclusion that there is positive
net average benefit continues to hold under both specifications.
Next, recall our analysis presumed that the price of private schools was only the tuition amount
and, in turn, implicitly assumed that the voucher could be used to only offset tuition. However,
in practice, the voucher could also be used to offset other costs such as fees and transportation
costs. Practically, it is difficult to fully account for these other additional costs in our analysis due
to the fact that they are unobserved for each individual. Nonetheless, to analyze the sensitivity
of our conclusions to this implicit assumption, we suppose that each individual has an additional
homogenous cost δ for each private participating school j in Jv that the voucher can be used to
offset. In this case, observe that the price of that school corresponds pj(0) + δ as opposed to pj(0),
the case in our analysis. While higher values of δ weakly increase the average benefit of the voucher
as the voucher potentially offsets a higher amount, it can also increase the net costs of the voucher.
Figure S.1(b) presents the estimates for the parameter AS(τsq), estimated in the same way as in
Table 2, for a range of values of δ when the price for the jth school in Jv in our main analysis is
redefined from pj(0) to pj(0) + δ. As before, for conservativeness, we focus on the two most flexible
specifications in Table 2, i.e. the nonparametric specification in Column (1) and the most flexible
auxiliary parametric specification in Column (10). The estimates reveal net average benefit of the
voucher gradually decreases with δ, implying the increase in costs is greater than that of benefits.
Observe that as long as we assume that the costs are not more than around $600, the conclusion
that there is positive net average benefit continues to hold under both specifications.
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S.3.4 Extension for the Role of Low-tuition Schools in the Program
In the empirical analysis in Section 5.5, we noted that our identification analysis can be straightfor-
wardly extended to evaluate what we can learn for the parameters defined in (36)-(38) for a given
value of κ ∈ R+. In this section, we describe this extension.
To begin, observe, similar to the parameters in Section 3, each of these parameters can be
written as functions of q. Indeed, this is true by definition for ACκ(τsq). For AB
κ(τsq), one can
modify the arguments in Proposition 3.1 in a straightforward manner to obtain that
ABκ(τsq) =
ajκ+1(τsq)∫
0
 J∑
j=jκ+1
qj(p1(0), . . . , pjκ(0), pjκ+1(τsq) + a, . . . , pJ(τsq) + a)
 da
+
j(τsq)∑
l=jκ+1
al+1(τsq)∫
al(τsq)
 J∑
j=l+1
qj(p1(0), . . . , pl(0), pl+1(τsq) + a, . . . , pJ(τsq) + a)
 da .
(S.74)
Then, given that both ABκ(τsq) and AC
κ(τsq) can be written in terms of q, it also directly follows
that ASκ(τsq) can as well. Below, we show how we can continue to apply Proposition 4.1 and
Proposition 4.2 to characterize what we can learn for each of these parameters under the baseline
nonparametric specification and under the auxiliary parametric specifications, respectively.
S.3.4.1 Baseline Nonparametric Specification
We start with the baseline nonparametric specification. Recall from the proof of Proposition 4.1
that it useful to first derive the expression for θB for each of the parameters. In the case of AB
κ(τsq),
similar to AB(τsq) in (S.7)-(S.9), observe that θ and θB can be shown to be given by
θ(q) ≡
jκ+1∑
l=0
J∑
j=jκ+1
∑
u∈U(l,τsq)
a¯u∫
au
qj(p1(0), . . . , pjκ(0), pjκ+1(τsq) + a, . . . , pJ(τsq) + a) da
+
j(τsq)∑
l=jκ+1
J∑
j=l+1
∑
u∈U(l,τsq)
a¯u∫
au
qj(min{p(0), p(τsq) + a}) da
=
jκ+1∑
l=0
J∑
j=jκ+1
∑
u∈U(l,τsq)
(a¯u − au) · βj(hκ(u)) +
j(τsq)∑
l=jκ+1
J∑
j=l+1
∑
u∈U(l,τsq)
(a¯u − au) · βj(h(u))
≡ θB(β) ,
where, similar to before, min{p(0), p(τsq) + a} ≡ (min{p1(0), p1(τsq) + a}, . . . ,min{pJ(0), pJ(τsq) +
a}), U(l, τsq) ≡ {u ∈ U : u ⊆ Pl(τsq)} and h(u) ∈ W for a given u ∈ U is such that h(u) =
J∏
j=1
u(j),
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and, in addition, hκ(u) ∈ W for a given u ∈ U is such that hκ(u)(j) = {pj(0)} for j ≤ jκ(τsq) and
hκ(u)(j) = u(j) for j > jκ(τsq). In the case of AC
κ(τsq), similar to AC(τ) in (S.10)-(S.11), observe
that θ and θB can be shown to be given by
θ(q) ≡
∑
j∈J
cκj (τsq) · qj(pκ(τsq))−
∑
j∈J
cj(0) · qj(p(0))
=
∑
j∈J
cκj (τsq) · βj({pκ(τsq)})−
∑
j∈J
cj(0) · βj({p(0)}) ≡ θB(β) .
The expression from ASκ(τsq) can similarly be derived from the difference of the above two expres-
sions. Then, recall again from the proof of Proposition 4.1 that we can show that the proposition
applies to these parameters if in Part 1 of the proof we can show that every for every q ∈ QB with
θ(q) = θ0, the β constructed from this q through (S.12) satisfies θB(β) = θ0. This can be shown for
these parameters using arguments analogous to those used to show this was the case for AB(τsq)
and AC(τsq) in Part 1 of the proof, from which it then follows that Proposition 4.1 applies to these
parameters.
Recall in our empirical analysis for the parameters in Section 3 we don’t directly apply optimiza-
tion problems from Proposition 4.1, but the more computational tractable alternatives from (32).
However, for the above parameters, the constructedWr is slightly different as they are defined over
a slightly different sets of prices. For these parameters, observe the following larger set of prices
given by
Wκ,r =Wr ∪ {w ∈ W : w(j) = {pj(0)} for j ≤ jκ,
w(j) ∈ (pj(τsq), pj(τsq) + ajκ+1(τsq)) or {pj(τsq)} for j > jκ}
corresponds to a set of prices that are sufficient in the definition of these additional parameters.
Then, replacing Wr by Wκ,r in the arguments leading to (32), we can similarly only consider
a subvector of β defined over this set sufficient to define the parameters, and similarly obtain
linear programs as in (32) giving outer sets containing the identified set for these parameters with
constraints corresponding to those on this subvector determined from every pair of w,w′ ∈ Wκ,r as
in Appendix S.2.3.
S.3.4.2 Auxiliary Parametric Specifications
We next proceed to the auxiliary parametric specifications. In this case, recall from the proof
of Proposition 4.2 that the proof, and hence the proposition, directly applies since each of these
parameters, analogous to the parameters in Section 3, can be rewritten as continuous functions of α.
However, recall that the expressions for these functions play an important role in the implementation
of Proposition 4.2 using linear programs when the specifications are rewritten in terms of the
Bernstein polynomial basis. Similar to the derivation of the expressions for AB(τsq) and AC(τsq) in
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Appendix S.2.4, one can derive these expressions for ABκ(τsq) and AC
κ(τsq), and in turn AS
κ(τsq),
for the specifications in Assumption O, Assumption AS and Assumption NS. For completeness, we
present these expressions below.
We start with Assumption O. In the case of ABκ(τsq), similar to (S.38), observe that by directly
substituting (S.27) in (S.74) we have
θA(α) ≡
J∑
j=jκ+1
K∑
k=0
αjk
ajκ+1(τsq)∫
0
bKk (pj(τsq) + a) da
+
j(τsq)∑
l=jκ+1
J∑
j=l+1
K∑
k=0
αjk
al+1(τsq)∫
al(τsq)
bKk (pj(τsq) + a) da ,
where the integrals can be explicitly characterized using (S.39). In the case of ACκ(τsq), similar to
(S.40), observe that by directly substituting (S.27) in (37) we have
θA(α) ≡
jκ∑
j=1
K∑
k=0
[cκj (τsq)− cj(0)] · bKk (pj(0)) · αjk
+
J∑
j=jκ+1
K∑
k=0
[cκj (τsq)b
K
k (pj(τsq))− cj(0)bKk (pj(0))] · αjk +
∑
j∈{g,n}
[cκj (τsq)− cj(0)] · αj .
Next, we proceed to Assumption AS. In the case of ABκ(τsq), similar to (S.52), observe that by
directly substituting (S.41) in (S.74) we have
θA(α) ≡
J∑
j=jκ+1
K∑
k=0
 jκ∑
i=1
αjikb
K
k (pi(0))ajκ(τsq) +
J∑
i=jκ+1
αjik
ajκ+1(τ)∫
0
bKk (pi(τsq) + a) da

+
j(τsq)∑
l=jκ+1
J∑
j=l+1
K∑
k=0
(
l∑
i=1
αjikb
K
k (pi(0))(al+1(τsq)− al(τsq))
+
J∑
i=l+1
αjik
al+1(τsq)∫
al(τ)
bKk (pi(τsq) + a) da
 ,
where the integrals can be explicitly characterized using (S.39). In the case of ACκ(τsq), similar to
(S.53), observe that by directly substituting (S.41) in (37) we have
θA(α) ≡
∑
j∈J
jκ∑
i=1
K∑
k=0
[cκj (τsq)− cj(0)] · bKk (pi(0)) · αjik
+
∑
j∈J
J∑
i=jκ+1
K∑
k=0
[cκj (τsq)b
K
k (pi(τsq))− cj(0)bKk (pi(0))] · αjik .
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Finally, we present the expressions for Assumption NS. In the case of ABκ(τsq), similar to (S.71),
observe that by directly substituting (S.54) in (S.74) we have
θA(α) ≡
J∑
j=jκ+1
K∑
kj ,ki=0
 jκ∑
i=1
αjikjki · bKki(pi(0)) ·
 ajκ+1(τsq)∫
0
bKkj (pj(τsq) + a) da

+
J∑
i=jκ+1
i 6=j
αjikjki ·
 ajκ+1(τ)∫
0
bKkj (pj(τsq) + a) · bKki(pi(τsq) + a) da


+
j(τsq)∑
l=jκ+1
J∑
j=l+1
K∑
kj ,ki=0
 l∑
i=1
αjikjki · bKki(pi(0)) ·
 al+1(τsq)∫
al(t)
bKkj (pj(τsq) + a) da

+
J∑
i=l+1
i 6=j
αjikjki ·
 al+1(τsq)∫
al(τsq)
bKkj (pj(τsq) + a) · bKki(pi(τsq) + a) da

 ,
where the integrals can be explicitly characterized using (S.39) and (S.72). In the case of ACκ(τsq),
similar to (S.73), observe that by directly substituting (S.54) in (37) we have
θA(α) ≡
jκ∑
j=1
jκ∑
i=1
i 6=j
K∑
kj ,ki=0
αjikjki · bKkj (pj(0))bKki(pi(0)) ·
[
cκj (τsq)− cj(0)
]
+
jκ∑
j=1
J∑
i=jκ+1
i 6=j
K∑
kj ,ki=0
αjikjki · bKkj (pj(0)) ·
[
bKki(pi(τsq))c
κ
j (τsq)− bKki(pi(0))cj(0)
]
+
J∑
j=jκ+1
jκ∑
i=1
i 6=j
K∑
kj ,ki=0
αjikjki · bKki(pi(0)) ·
[
bKkj (pj(τsq))c
κ
j (τsq)− bKkj (pj(0))cj(0)
]
+
J∑
j=jκ+1
J∑
i=jκ+1
i 6=j
K∑
kj ,ki=0
αjikjki ·
[
bKkj (pj(τsq))b
K
ki
(pi(τsq))c
κ
j (τsq)− bKkj (pj(0))bKki(pi(0))cj(0)
]
+
∑
j∈{g,n}
jκ∑
i=1
K∑
k=0
αjik · bKk (pi(0)) ·
[
cκj (τsq)− cj(0)
]
+
∑
j∈{g,n}
J∑
i=jκ+1
K∑
k=0
αjik ·
[
bKk (pi(τsq))c
κ
j (τsq)− bKk (pi(0))cj(0)
]
.
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